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ABSTRACT
Yugoslavia’s collapse in the early 1990s was the first European post cold-war challenge for the 
West, the EU and the US, to meet. However, it is clear that, following from a slow and flawed 
start, the US did not provide the required leadership to which Europe had been accustomed 
though it occasionally came up with meaningful policy options to stop the genocidal war in 
Bosnia, while the Europeans looked all-too-willing to accept the ‘facts on the ground’. During 
the course of the three-and-half year long war, which claimed about two hundred thousands of 
lives, the US-EU split became quite visible, and at various times, it looked to many as if the US 
had changed its traditional policy of leadership for a much more reduced role in crises 
management on European soil, an assumption boastfully confirmed by the Europeans until the 
US came back to the scene in 1995.
The return of the US with long-sought leadership and resources put an end to the carnage in 
Bosnia and brought about the Dayton Accords. At the same time, it underlined the fact that the 
EU is unable to put things in order on its own continent, and that the US’ traditional role is 
bound to continue in Europe. The dissertation is a short survey of the US’ initial flawed 
diagnosis of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and then of Bosnia, the wrangling between the US and 
the EU which became more and more visible in the course of 1993 and 1994 and finally the US’ 
policy of knocking heads together to achieve the Dayton Accords.
IV
ÖZET
1990’ların başlarında Yugoslavya’nın süratle dağılması AB ve ABD açısından soğuk savaş 
sonrasında meydana gelen ve dikkatle ele alınabilecek iddialı bir hadiseydi. Ancak hemen 
farkedildi ki, ABD, Bosna’daki soykırımı andıran savaşı durdurmak için aradabir mantıklı 
siyaset seçenekleri ortaya koymuş olmasına rağmen, genel manada düşünüldüğünde fazlaca etkili 
olamadı. Öte yandan Avrupah devletler savaş alanında silahların belirlediği vaziyeti 
kabullenmeye oldukça istekli göründüler. Üç buçuk yıl süren ve 200.000 insanın hayatına 
mâlolan bu savaş sırasında ABD ile AB arasındaki görüş ve yaklaşım farklılıkları iyice belirgin 
hale geldi. 1995’te ABD’nin liderlik rolünü üstlenerek yeniden sahneye dönüşüne kadar geçen 
zaman zarfındaki genel vaziyet bir çok insana sanki ABD ile AB’nin Avrupa kıtasındaki krizlere 
yönelik politikalarını değiştirmiş oldukları intibaını vermişti.
ABD’nin Bosna işinde meseleye yeniden el atması ve uzunca bir zamandır özlemle beklenen 
liderlik ve bunun için lâzım gelen kaynakları temin etmesi Bosna’daki soykırıma son verdi ve 
Dayton Antlaşmalarının imzalanmasını sağladı. Aynı zamanda bu geri dönüş AB’nin 
Avrupa’daki bu tür işleri çözme konusundaki yetersizliğini ve Avrupa kıtasında ABD’nin 
rolünün mutlaka devam edeceği gerçeğinin de altını çizmiş oldu. Bu master tezi bütün bu 
olayların yani ABD’nin Yugoslavya’nın dağılması ve Bosna savaşının sebepleri konusundaki ilk 
hatalı analizi; bilhassa 1993 ve 1994 yıllarında belirgin hale gelen AB ile ABD arasındaki bütün 
tartışmalar ve anlaşmazlıklar ve son olarak da ABD’nin taraflara baskı yaparak Dayton 
Antlaşmaları’nın imzalanmasını sağlamak yolundaki çabalarının genel bir gözden geçirilmesi 
niteliğindedir.
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V III
The Yugoslav dissolution and the ensuing wars in Slovenia, Croatia and particularly in Bosnia, 
and all those terrible pictures which filled television screens daily for a long time, put the ability 
of the EU to the test. It also put to the test all those utterances made profusely about the ‘new 
world order’ and cooperation between various international actors, namely the EU, the US and 
Russia. The shocking net result left nothing to be desired: more than two hundred thousand 
dead and two million people forced out their homes, to say the least. A cursory look at the 
crisis and the international policy would suggest that much of that was due to a Europe that used 
ineptly the Yugoslav succession wars, particularly the one in Bosnia, as a guinea pig in its 
curious for search for some sort of leadership role in Europe. European smooth-talkers appear 
to have acted under the impression that the way they mutter to each other in Europe would 
somehow persuade Balkan leaders like President Milosevic of Serbia to stop the war and make 
peace. The US, on the other hand, seemed happy to exchange its traditional role of leadership 
for an undecided, unclear one which at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia amounted to 
appeasement. Continual talk by President Bush in 1992, professing powerlessness in the face 
of the allegedly invincible chieftains in Bosnia seemed to suggest that the US and Europe had 
swapped their roles.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Moreover, it looked as if the atrocities committed largely by Serbs and to a lesser extent by 
Croats in the course of the war in Bosnia created legends that problems of this nature are really 
endemic in a region where politicians and even ordinary people are inclined to torture and kill· 
‘after all, it is the Balkans’. According to these legends, the war in the 1990s is simply a
continuation of previous ethnic conflicts, and this one is not going to be the last one. Put in a 
nutshell, the war in Bosnia was caused by ‘ancient hatred’, and therefore, it is a civil war; the 
parties to that should be treated as more or less equally guilty, assumptions which do not seem 
to be borne out by historical research.
As this summary would indicate, the topic under review, namely. The US and the Bosnian 
War: An Analytical Survey on the Formulation of US Policy from the Yugoslav Dissolution 
to the Dayton Accords, would require research and analysis at there levels: first, it requires a 
careful study of the internal dynamics of the crisis, leading to the break-up Yugoslavia; second 
it involves the formulation of US policy towards the crisis and finally, it necessitates explanation 
of the US-EU split in approach to the war(s), a significant factor in shaping the US policy and 
also in worsening conditions on the ground in Bosnia. What attracted me to the present research 
is the fact that the Yugoslav dissolution and the bloody Bosnian war was one of the obvious 
cases which demonstrated differences between the US and Europe in approach to crises on 
European soil. Therefore, any such work would give me the opportunity to extend my 
knowledge of international relations on the US’ general stance to world affairs after the end of 
the Cold War, as well as on the basic features of Balkan politics. The aim of this study is 
manifold: (i) to look into US foreign policy-making process in the 1990s within the context of 
the Bosnian war, (ii) to grasp the main inhibitions in US’ approach to the crisis, (iii) to highlight 
EU-US differences, (iii) to examine the US internal debate about the conduct of foreign policy, 
US interpretation of multilateralism and the place of international organisations, in particular.
the UN and NATO in US foreign policy-making, (iv) to project into the future by employing 
the US attitude towards the Bosnian war.
The dissertation is composed of six chapters, four of which focus in depth on the events and the 
formulation of US policy, while the other two consist of the introduction and the conclusion. 
Following the introduction, the second chapter begins with a brief summary of events and 
incidents, leading to the outbreak of second Yugoslavia which the charismatic leader Tito 
established and led until his death in 1980. Some explanation about the cohesive elements which 
kept Yugoslavia together for more than three and a half decades is offered here and there, while 
a great chunk of the chapter concentrates on the dissolution process which started almost 
immediately after Tito’s death. The first part of this lengthy chapter deals with the wars in 
Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the genocidal war in Bosnia from various perspectives. The 
second half is devoted to an analysis of all the factors which moulded the initial US response to 
the crisis and the ensuing wars.
The third chapter, though slightly shorter, is a crucially important one. It first sets out the 
situation on the ground in Bosnia at the beginning of 1994, and then deals with the peace plan 
which Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance pieced together. It explains at some length Clinton 
Administration’s uneasiness about the plan and enumerates all the modifications which the US 
wished to be inserted in it. The second part of the chapter concentrates on the US’ ‘lift and 
strike’ option after the Serbs refused to sign on to the Vance-Owen plan. The second part also
concentrates on ‘Europeanisation’ of US’ ‘lift and strike’ option, while the last part focuses on 
vacillation of US policies throughout 1993.
The fourth chapter is also a significantly important one, in that, following the first part that sets 
out the worsening situation in Bosnia at the beginning of 1994, it devotes large space to the 
internal debate in the US, particularly between the Administration and the Congress, on Bosnia. 
It explains how the Congressional support for a robust stance against the Serbs and the 
Congressional criticism of the handling of the Europeans gradually moved the President and his 
team to a unilateral approach. The last part of this chapter sets out the US’ role within the 
Contact Group of five nations.
The fifth chapter deals with the US’ revision of policy options and the growing uneasiness within 
the Administration with the Europeans. It looks at how the American exasperation with the 
Europeans, whose mollycoddling of the Serbs in Bosnia was being severely criticised by the 
Congress, led the Administration to force the Serbs to accept the Contact Group peace plan 
through coercion. The last part of this chapter explains the main points of the Dayton Peace 
Accords in a critical way. The last chapter, the conclusion, is an assessment of US policy 
towards the Yugoslav crisis,in general, and the Bosnian war in particular.
THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION
When the Yugoslav army tanks rolled into the newly deelared Republic o f 
Slovenia in late June 1991, international community was taken aback. 
Although there had been signs of uneasiness in former Yugoslavia, nobody 
was apparently expecting a war tearing the country apart.
CHAPTER II
In reality, dissolution process had started, since all the elements, which had 
kept post-1945 Yugoslavia together, began to crumble in the early 1980s. 
Josip Broz Tito, the masterful politician and the charismatic leader', had died 
in 1980. For three and a half decades after the Second World War, 
Yugoslavia had been ruled by him at the head of a loyal communist party. 
Dedicated to an independent and unified Yugoslavia, he had managed to resist 
Soviet expansionism. He had also managed to somehow put all the many 
ethnic groups in Yugoslavia’s various republics into one-body politic. His 
anti-Soviet stance had earned him the trust and support of the West which in 
turn contributed to Yugoslavia’s economic prosperity. He had acted as the 
country’s credit card from 1950s to 1970s, when the Yugoslav economy was 
booming through extensive borrowing from the West. His death put an abrupt
end to Western assistance, as well as seemingly harmonious relations among 
Yugoslavia’s various nations, nationalities and minorities. The expulsion of 
Yugoslavia from the Comintern by Stalin in 1948^ had drawn closer all the 
Yugoslav peoples who maintained a kind of national unity in the face o f an 
external danger. By the late 1980s, however, the ‘Soviet danger’ had eclipsed, 
and ultra-nationalism was on an upward trend with devastating consequences.^
Yugoslavia was composed of six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Montenegro and two 
autonomous regions, Kosovo and Metohija ( hereafter Kosovo/a ) and the 
Vojvodina. Initially, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were recognized as 
nations, and gradually the same status was also granted to the Bosnians, 
Macedonians and Montenegrins. In addition, there were a number of ethnic 
groups who were treated as single minorities in all those republics. The 
Kosovar Albanians and the Vojvodina Hungarians constituted the biggest 
challenge in this respect. These problems were to be addressed through the
4constitutional amendments enacted in 1974.
Since it was impossible for each minority to unite with their co-nationals 
within the frontiers of the same state, the Yugoslav constitution had provided
for provisions, declaring that national minorities could not have their own 
republics; instead, they were expected to become integrated into other 
republics. According to the amendments, enacted in 1974, Bosnians, 
Macedonians, and the Montenegrins were given political recognition as 
nations, as well as the two biggest national minorities, Albanians o f Kosovo/a, 
and Hungarians of Vojvodina. Kosovo/a, with a 90 per cent Albanian 
majority, and Vojvodina, with a Serb majority but also a large Hungarian and 
a smaller Croat minority were granted in the 1974 constitution the status just 
below that of a full republic, which meant that each had its own courts, police 
and territorial defence and perhaps even more important an independent vote 
in Yugoslavia’s collective presidency alongside the other six republics. By 
this way, Tito had aimed at a balance among different nationalities of 
Yugoslavia. These two provinces were not recently acquired, f'hey had 
existed since the early days of the regime but it was only after 1974 that they 
were allowed direct participation in decision-making at the federal level, 
bypassing Serbia.·”’
After Tito, Yugoslavia was to be governed by a kind of ‘collective 
presidency’. As soon as the unifying influence of Tito was gone, however, 
each republic began to reassert its individuality and independence. By the
middle of the 1980s, anti-Serbian unrest was growing steadily in Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Kosovo/a. Coupled with that, the country was confronted with 
severe economic problems. For instance, inflation reached a staggering 80 
percent in 1984. Gasoline had to be rationed and housing was scarce and very 
expensive. The cost of basic necessities skyrocketed while luxuries, such as 
television sets, were almost completely out of reach for most people. There 
was little or no cooperation among republics. The desire of each republic to 
independently run its own affairs gravely disrupted the country’s overall 
industry and transportation. The railroads, for example, were allegedly a 
national system. But the republics would not allow their own locomotives to 
be taken past their homeland boundaries. Each time a train crossed into 
another republic, the locomotive had to be changed. To make matters worse, 
Yugoslavia found international money-lenders very unwilling to extend 
credits, as they used to while Tito was alive. Western countries had now 
suspects against Yugoslavia, a country in the process of disintegration without 
a strong and able leader to keep it together.'^’ Under these circumstances, the 
relatively richer northern republics like Slovenia and Croatia did not want to 
be ‘exploited’ by the poor south while nationalistic feelings were taking over
n
in Serbia, the largest republic with the largest population.
Nationalism was growing by leaps and bounds among Serbian intellectuals 
especially after the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy Of Arts and 
Sciences. This Memorandum demanded that a speedy end be put to what it 
called the federal government’s discriminatory policies towards Serbia in the 
economic field. It claimed that the partition of Serbia into three parts under 
Tito’s 1974 constitution was unfair, and it demanded that the allegedly anti- 
Serb policy pursued in Kosovo/a by Albanian separatists and irredentists (with 
support from non-Serb republics), which the authors blamed for the steady 
exodus of Serbs, be stopped. The Memorandum also dealt with the position of 
Serbs in Croatia (11.6 %) who were allegedly discriminated against and even 
subjected to genocide. The guiding principle of the ‘strong Yugoslavia, weak 
Serbia’ was, according to the Memorandum, the root cause for all the ills: the 
Memorandum called for its reversal, especially for the abolition o f the 1974 
constitution under which Kosovo/a and Vojvodina were allowed to evolve 
into de facto republics. It concluded that under Croat 4'ito, Serbs had been 
treated unfairly.
The Memorandum was a modernised version of earlier plans for a Greater 
Serbia, taking in also Bosnia, the bulk of Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
Nostalgia for the first royalist Yugoslavia was echoed in numerous articles
and books that followed the Memorandum’s publication. The Greater Serbia 
program also had an economic dimension. Croatia loomed particularly large 
in those Great Serb plans because of its oil and gas in addition to its hard 
currency tourist earnings. Bosnia, though poorer than Croatia and Slovenia, 
was also important not least because it had some natural resources and also 
because much of Yugoslavia’s huge arms industry was located on its territory.
The Memorandum was to prepare the ideological ground for Slobodan 
Milosevic’s rise. When in 1987 a change in leadership in Serbia brought 
Milosevic to the fore, he successfully played the Serbian nationalist card. He 
made a point of speaking out on behalf of the Serbian and Montenegrin 
minorities in Kosovo/a, which earned him immediate popularity and 
legitimacy among the Serbian masses. The Serbs began to question whether 
the ‘Croat’ Tito was impartial in his attitude towards Serbia. Milosevic 
became a nationalist strong man after an incident in Kosovo/a in April 1987 - 
the centerpiece of Serbian historical legend, - now 90% Albanian. His 
popularity reached new heights when, in January 1989, Serbia extended its 
control over the tiny republic of Montenegro by means of a political coup 
under his leadership. So by this political control, Serbia got Montenegro’s 
vote in Yugoslavia’s collective federal presidency. The arbitrary abolition in
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March 1989 of the autonomous status of the provinces of both Kosovo/a and 
Vojvodina which had been guaranteed by the amendments in Federal 
Constitution in 1974 was one of Milosevic’s chauvinistic policies.^ All ofthat 
had been closely watched with concern by all the non-Serb republics. 
Politicians in Slovenia and Croatia were now convinced that Milosevic posed 
a threat to the stability o f the entire country. By the beginning of autumn 
1989 , Slovenia’s patience was wearing thin; despite loud Serbian protests, the 
Slovenian Assembly passed a series of amendments to the Slovenian 
Constitution, claming for Slovenia the unilateral right to secede, and the 
exclusive right to impose a state of emergency in the republic or to authorize 
the presence or movement of military formations within its borders.'^
On the Serbian front, during 1990 Serbian nationalism under Milosevic was 
taking an ever more aggressive turn. No longer was it enough for Serbs living 
outside Serbia to have their rights protected. They also had to own and 
control the territory they inhabited, regardless of prior sovereignty. These 
Serbian claims had no consistent principals behind them. Where Serbs a 
minority, as in Kosovo/a, they asserted a historical, rather than a numerical, 
right to rule. Where no such historical right was possible, as in the Krajina 
area of Croatia, they claimed self-determination on the majority principal."
According to the advocates of Greater Serbia, they were to insist that Serb 
territories extended to wherever a Serb lay buried. Vojislav Seselj, one such 
prominent advocate who appeared on the leading political scene in the late 
1980s, argued that Serbia’s territory covered the territory from the ‘sanctuaries 
of the east to the tombs in the west’, namely from the disputed province of 
Kosovo/a to the scenes of Croat fascist crimes during the Second World
War. 12
These openly-expressed views in favor of Serb hegemony in the region soon 
found its echo in the north-western republics, Croatia and Slovenia which 
gradually concluded that they had to break from Yugoslavia one way or the 
other. In March and April o f 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held their first multi­
party elections in almost fifty years. The communist reformers lost the 
elections to parties favoring national sovereignty within a reorganized 
Yugoslav confederation. By the end of 1990 Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia 
were no longer under communist governments, and Macedonia was under a 
coalition government in which the communists were a minority. Only in 
Serbia and Montenegro did the communists still hold on to power. Under 
these new conditions Milosevic’s continuous talk of the need to recentralize 
the system was responded to by Slovenia and Croatia which argued that the
12
system needed to be fully confederalized, with the retention o f only an 
economic union and coordination in foreign policy and military matters.'^
On December 23, 1990, Slovenia held a plebiscite in which almost ninety 
percent of the eligible voters authorized the Slovenian parliament to declare 
independence if in six months the Slovenian government had not negotiated a 
new constitutional arrangement that would address the Slovenes’ democratic 
aspiration for sovereignty. The last straw for the Slovenians and Croatians 
came when the Serbs and the Montenegrins, together with those bogus 
representatives of no longer existent Kosovo/a and Vojvodina, blocked the 
confirmation of the very moderate, rational and conciliatory Croatian Stipe 
Mesic as chairman of the Federal presidency. According to the post-Tito 
constitutional arrangement, the chairmanship of the Federal presidency, the 
highest executive body in the country, was to past each year on to the 
representative of a different republic who was to be chosen by his republic’s 
parliament. It was Croatia’s turn to select the federal president and Stipe 
Mesic was the first non-communist ever to be nominated to head the federal 
presidency. That action accelerated the daily worsening slide into chaos. 
Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence but did not actually secede 
from Yugoslavia, saying they would wait to see if a new federation of
13
sovereign states could be arranged. Although talks and negotiations continued 
for the rest of the summer of 1991, no compromise was to be reached.
2.1. The wars in Slovenia and Croatia
Following its proclamation of independence on 23 June 1991, Slovenia took 
control of its borders. Croatia followed suit a day later. Yugoslav Federal 
Army (hereafter JNA) used this as a formal excuse for unleashing an attack on 
Slovenia, which began on 25 June 1991. This was the start o f the terrible and 
bloody war in Yugoslavia.
The war in Slovenia set the alarm bells ringing. Western leaders found 
themselves in a dilemma. They argued among themselves whether the 
conflict was an internal one or an aggression by one state against another. 
While they were talking, Serbia, with the overwhelmingly Serbianized JNA at 
its disposal, was freely working to make its ‘Greater Serbia’ dreams come 
true. However, following some initial success, the JNA ran out of steam when 
faced with a small but extremely well-organized resistance by the Slovenian 
territorial defence. With the JNA’s failure in the face of this unexpected 
resistance by the Slovenian people, the Serbs’ dream of Greater Serbia began
14
to crumble though it was to take President Milosevic and others, exponent o f 
Greater Serbia, many years to grasp that.
While the war in Slovenia was in full-swing. President Tudjman of Croatia sat 
back and watched though he had promised President Kucan of Slovenia in 
December 1990 his military support and cooperation, should the neighboring 
break-away republic come under attack by the JNA. At a meeting of the 
Croatian National Security Council, President Tudjman said; ‘we shall not 
involve ourselves in this war (in Slovenia) in any way; it is in the interest of 
the Croatian nation to remain passive,’ a policy which became Croatia’s 
suicide or self-termination. Nevertheless, despite betrayal by Croatia, 
Slovenia did well and the JNA agreed to withdraw from this republic.
“1'his withdrawal was all that Slovenia needed: it was too 
far to the west for the JNA and Serbia to contemplate a 
protracted war. In this conflict, Slovenia gained about 200 
tanks, 400 artillery pieces and mortars, many anti-aircraft 
and anti-tank weapons, and ammunition sufficient for a 
large army to wage an intensive war for one year.” ' 4
On the face of it, by mid July, the Serbian and the Federal Army leaders had 
decided to let Slovenia go' \  but they were now serious about Croatia: Croatia 
must be held at all costs. It was more suitable for subjugation, given its 11 % 
Serb population scattered in suitable enclaves and already secretly armed to
the teeth by Serbia with modern weapons. There had already been incidents 
and it did not take long for these skirmishes to turn into a full-blown war 
between well-armed Serb units and poorly armed Croatian territorial defence 
forces. And the Federal Army did not hesitate to intervene under the pretext 
o f separating the warring sides. It soon became clear, however, that the JNA 
was in fact turning territory over to the Serbs. In September 1991, the Serb 
‘rebels’ seized the Krajina region - Knin being the capital - by cleansing the 
Croats there. During this extensive ethnic cleansing campaign so many Croats 
were either killed or forced out of the region. The destruction visited on 
Eastern Slavonia was so harsh - even in the areas where so little Serb 
population existed - that experts thought that it was worse than what happened 
to European towns during World War 11. The .INA also targeted Croatia’s 
most famous tourist resorts, including Dubrovnik, and slaughtered thousands 
of Croats.
As the war grew in intensity through the summer of 1991, the European 
Community (hereafter EU) and the United Nations (hereafter UN) in order to 
achieve a cease-fire and agreement among alt the Yugoslav republics initiated 
a joint effort. Special UN envoy Cyrus Vance and the EU negotiator Lord 
Peter Carrington were appointed to do the mediation. I'hey both argued that
16
there should be no Western recognition of the independence of any Yugoslav 
republics until all had agreed on their mutual relationships.
However, towards the end of 1991, all the obstacles that prevented the 
recognition of the republics were coming to an end. In December the 
Maastricht process was over and the Soviet Union was dissolving fast. The 
US had already declared that it would recognise Ukraine as an independent 
state. Under these newly-created circumstances Germany argued that 
Slovenia and Croatia should be recognized while other members of the EU 
wavered. They were all busy in trade-offs in the closing sessions of 
Maastricht negotiations. But events in the Soviet Union and on the ground in 
Croatia gradually forced them to take action. When they finalized the 
Maastricht negotiations, they set up a special commission headed by the 
French Constitutional Expert Robert Badinter with the task o f assessing which 
republics met the recognition requirements set by the EU, requirements like 
respect for territorial integrity, respect for minority rights and establishment of 
democratic institutions. Following recommendations from the Commission, 
on December 17, 1991 an EU summit decided to grant Slovenia and Croatia 
recognition. This was also official confirmation that Yugoslavia was no
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longer in existence. In the meantime, the war had ended in late December 
1991 after Serb forces had seized roughly a quarter of Croatian territory.'^
2.2. The Dissolution Process and the US Policy
d'here is no indication that the US had ever had any ‘indigenous interest in the 
Balkans’ until the end of the Second World War. In other words, “ the region 
had never been a major focal point for US policy. American interest emerged 
principally as a by-product of Washington’s overall interest in preventing the 
Soviet Union’s domination of Europe.” This came about with Tito’s break 
with the Soviet Union. Although Tito was a true believer in communism, he 
opposed Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence in the Balkans. The Stalin- 
Tito break in 1948 provided opportunities, upon which America quickly 
seized, for US efforts to contain Soviet expansionism. The decision to give 
economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia in its struggle against 
Moscow was purely pragmatic and dictated by realpolitic.
In short, during the cold war Yugoslavia was a pawn between the US and the
Soviet Union in the power struggle in the Balkans.
“The main US goal was to prevent Yugoslavia from falling 
under Soviet domination. Sueh a development, US poliey 
makers believed, would tip the balance of power in the
Balkans and increase the pressure on Greece and Turkey, 
two key NATO allies, as well as reduce Romania’s room for 
maneuver. Hence support for Yugoslavia’s unity, 
independence and territorial integrity became a fundamental 
tenet of US policy toward the Balkans.” ' ^
Although this assistance did not turn Yugoslavia into a fully-fledged ally, it
ensured that Yugoslavia did not fall back into the Soviet orbit, and by the end
of the 1970s, Moscow’s position in the Balkans had seriously eroded.
The Yugoslav dissolution was the first post-cold war crisis that both the US 
and the Soviet Union had to tackle. Oddly enough, both were still guided by 
cold-war principles and inhibitions;
“Both Washington and Moscow were slow to comprehend 
the nature of this change in part because they were 
preoccupied with other issues, the United States with the 
Gulf war, and the USSR with its own internal problems. 
Hence, both misjudged the seriousness of the crisis and 
failed to appreciate its wider implications for European 
security.” 19
At the outset, the US continued to follow cold war perspectives towards the 
erisis in Yugoslavia. Aeeording to the US, should Yugoslavia disintegrate, it 
might fall under Soviet influence. When Croatian representatives came to the 
US in the fall of 1990 to discuss a plan for a peaceful reorganization of 
Yugoslavia as a confederation, American Secretary of State James Baker, and
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National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, simply rebuked them. The US 
was not interested in any plan likely to tear the country apart; if anything, the 
Bush administration favored the preservation of both Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union as unified states , if necessary, by ‘military force.’
When the Yugoslav crisis erupted into violence in the summer of 1991, the 
Bush administration’s attention was focused on other issues like the Gulf War, 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the German unification. So, although in 
November 1990 a report by the CIA , leaked to the press, had seriously 
warned that a war in Yugoslavia leading to the disintegration would be likely 
within 18 months, the US did not give the high-level policy attention the 
report deserved. Several factors influenced this initial US policy towards the 
crisis. American policy-makers were worried that any encouragement of 
separatist trends in Slovenia and Croatia would have a ripple effect elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe in general and the USSR, in particular, which the US vowed 
to keep together with Mr. Gorbachev at its head, encouraging a host of 
separatist and irredentist movements from the Baltics to Bessarabia and to 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. As a result, the US continued to insist on 
preserving Yugoslavia’s unity.
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The US insistence on the maintenance of the Yugoslav integrity contributed to 
the escalation of the conflict by encouraging President Milosevic and the JNA 
to believe that the US would not oppose the Federal Army’s intervention to 
hold the country together, provided that this was to be done quickly and with a 
minimal loss of life. President Bush declared in early 1991 that the US 
‘would not reward’ those who split off from Yugoslavia and this warning was 
to be reiterated in June the same year by James Baker who said that the US 
would not recognise any unilateral declarations o f independence by Slovenia 
and Croatia, and that American policy supported a democratic and united
Yugoslavia. He argued that self-determination could be unilateral but that it
2 1
must be pursued by dialogue and peaceful means.
When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, both republics hoped 
that this step would internationalize the crisis and prevent Milosevic from 
calling the upcoming aggression an ‘internal matter’. However, even after the 
fighting in Slovenia in June 1991, the US continued to see it as a ‘local 
conflict’, and the Bush administration viewed it largely as a ‘European 
problem’ left to the Europeans to handle since it involved no broad US 
strategic interests.^^ It encouraged the EU which was engrossed in the 
approaching Maastricht negotiations to take the lead in managing the issue.
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So the main vehicle for crisis management became the EU rather than NATO 
or the US.
Another factor which contributed to the US inhibition was the reluctance of 
the US military to get involved in the crisis. Named as ‘Vietnam syndrome’, 
this reluctance appears to have influenced many of the top US military officers 
who had served in Vietnam. Clearly, they were hesitant to get dragged into an 
unpopular land war without a clear exit strategy and viewed Yugoslavia as a 
potential quagmire. To some extent they were also mesmerized by the success 
of the Gulf War. The lessons they drew from this experience were that (i) if 
US troops were to be used, the US should go in, as it did in the Gull’ with 
overwhelming force in order to achieve a quick and decisive victory; (ii) there 
should be a clear political and military objective and (iii) there should be a 
clear endgame and exit s t r a t e g y . T h e  most vocal and articulate advocate of 
this position was General Colin Powell, the then Chairman-of-the-Joint- 
Chiefs-oi-Staff His prestige and strong political standing with the Congress 
as a result of his role in directing the Gulf war gave him a considerable 
advantage and allowed him to largely dominate the internal debate within the 
Bush administration. Few officials were ready to challenge him, especially
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since he had strong backing within the rest of the military establishment and in
the Congress.
President Bush was also reluctant to get involved in an overseas conflict in an 
election year. There was criticism about the internal policies of the Bush 
Administration. So he wanted to be seen engaged in internal affairs rather 
than foreign policy issues especially one that might lead to large casualties. 
Many of his top political advisers supported this view because they were
convinced that the American people would not support a war in Yugoslavia.24
During 1990 and early 1991 these were the key factors that formulated the 
initial US approach to the crisis. Warren Zimmerman, the last US 
Ambassador to former Yugoslavia explains the mood in the US policy-making 
circles during 1991:
“even without threatening force, the United States could 
have thrown more weight behind the effort to prevent 
greater violence. However, between July 1991 and March 
1992, the United States was not a major factor in the 
Yugoslav crisis. In the fall of 1991, at a US ambassadors’ 
meeting in Berlin, a friend from the State Department’s 
European Bureau told me that Yugoslavia had become a tar 
baby in Washington, nobody wanted to touch it. With the 
American presidential election just a year away, it was seen 
as a loser.”25
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2.3. The Bosnian War (1992-1993)
Bosnia was by area third largest member of the Yugoslav federation, after 
Serbia and Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population of Bosnia 
was 44 % Moslem/Bosniak, 31 % Serb, 17 % Croat and 8 % others, including 
5 % Yugoslavs, most of whom were products of mixed marriages. Though 
percentages varied from one place to another, there was no significant urban 
center anywhere in Bosnia which did not have a large mixed population. It is 
against the background of these figures that one could judge the nature of 
Bosnia’s ethnic pluralism or, by the same token, the implications of the policy 
of enforced ethnic separation, and the destruction of Bosnia’s urban 
civilization. Bosnia represented a modern, pluralistic society in the Balkans. 
For years, the Bosnians had been living in peace and harmony. The Serbs, the 
Croats and the Muslims (It is important to note that the term Muslim with 
capital ‘M ’ represents their political identity) had been used to living together 
as neighbors regardless of their differences even in the same apartments. The 
main reason which changed this order was the ultra-nationalistic Serbs and 
their aims in mind. “The Bosnian war was not caused by ancient hatreds; it 
was caused by modern politicians, notably Mr. Milosevic and Dr. Karadzic, 
with the help o f the political controllers of Radio Television Belgrade.”
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On 29 February and 1 March 1992 the Bosnian Government held, at the 
behest of the EU, a referendum on independence as a precondition for 
diplomatic recognition. This was boycotted by most of Bosnia’s Serbs at the 
urging of Radovan Karadzic, who was the leader o f the Serbian party (SDS) 
and an ally of President Milosevic. 99 per cent of the voters, who took part in 
the referendum, voted in favor of independence. Bosnia was recognized as an 
independent state by the EU on 6 April 1992 and the US followed suit. It 
became a member of the UN together with Slovenia and Croatia on 22 May.
It appears that the Bosnian war was the result of a pre-meditated plan of 
territorial conquest to be carried out jointly by the JNA and the Serb 
paramilitaries in order to achieve their ‘Greater Serbia’ goal. Planning for it 
had begun a long time ago in the autumn of 1991. Artillery positions had 
been set up around major cities, including Sarajevo in the winter of 1991-92.^^ 
In addition, the JNA units with artillery were being transformed into Bosnia 
from Croatia early in 1992 after the cease-fire had been achieved there. In 
May 1991, the Serb ‘autonomous regions’ had been proclaimed in Bosnia 
arbitrarily, and in October 1991 a Serb ‘parliament’ had been set up. All ol 
this culminated in the proclamation of a Bosnian Serb republic on 27 March
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1992. That the Serbs’ aim was to annex the whole of Bosnia now became an 
increasing probability.
On 30 March, following a series of incidents in various Bosnian cities, the 
JNA’s chief declared that his troops were ready to ‘protect’ the Serbs of 
Bosnia. In April massacres on a large scale were carried out by the Serb 
paramilitary forces in close cooperation with the JNA in eastern Bosnia. 
Fighting soon spread to other areas. At this stage, the Croats in the south as 
well as those in the north fought successfully in alliance with the Moslems. 
But this Croat-Moslem alliance was to be short-lived. President Tudjman’s 
opportunistic approach to divide Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia helped 
the Serbs a great deal in their policy of conquest. From the end of 1992 
summer onwards, when it became clear that no foreign intervention would be 
forthcoming, the Croats under the leadership of Mate Boban and under 
Tudjman’s supervision, began to ‘clean’ some areas in southern Bosnia from 
Muslims. According to Serb-Croat deal in 1992, Serbia would concede 
Croatian sovereignty in the Krajina, while the Croats would let Eastern 
Slavonia go to Serbia. Tudjman would be compensated for the loss of 
Croatian territory with a large piece of Bosnia with Serbia getting the rest.
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When fighting broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, Belgrade authorities 
repeatedly stated - as they had done in Croatia in 1991- that the JNA was only 
acting as a peace-keeping force. But the reality on the ground was completely 
different. If anything, the JNA was conducting a war of aggression against a 
neighboring state which had just received world-wide diplomatic recognition. 
On 27 April the new Yugoslav State comprising Serbia and Montenegro was 
proclaimed, and in May an announcement was made to the effect that those 
JNA soldiers serving in Bosnia who were Bosnian Serbs would be transferred 
with their weapons to the new Serb republic in Bosnia while the rest would 
withdraw across the border into Serbia and Montenegro. General Ratko 
Mladic, commander of the JNA in Knin during the war in Croatia in 1991, 
was appointed head of the Bosnian Serb army. This calculated trick by 
President Milosevic gave a golden opportunity to many of the Western 
politicians, who were all too eager to avoid involvement, to call the conflict in 
Bosnia a ‘civil war’ that would not call for outside intervention.
At the beginning of May, while the Serbs tightened their grip on Bosnia the 
UN troops already stationed in Sarajevo were withdrawn at the order of the 
UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the grounds that those
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troops had been earmarked for deployment in Croatia for peace-keeping 
purposes there. At this stage, the international community appeared very 
reluctant to take any tangible steps to stop the carnage in Bosnia. The US and 
Britain seemed overwhelmed with domestic problems, increasing economic 
depression in both, and the approaching US presidential elections, while the 
UN was engrossed in keeping the cease-fire between the Croats and the Serbs 
in Croatia. The only thing the US administration proposed to do was the 
imposition of a comprehensive package of sanctions on Serbia for its role in 
the war in Bosnia. However, when the US first floated the idea, the UN 
Security Council (hereafter UNSC) opposed it, while Britain and France 
argued against. But the events in Bosnia unfolded at a bewildering speed, 
filling television screens with horrors of Serbian atrocities, and in the end, the 
Powers which were unwilling to take any military measures, were forced to 
impose a trade embargo on Serbia, which came in the form of a UNSC 
resolution at the end of May. It banned all trade, including oil, with Serbia 
and Montenegro, required all countries to freeze overseas financial assets of 
Yugoslavia and called for a reduction in the size of Yugoslav diplomatic
missions.28
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Though well in place from June 1992 onwards, the embargo did very little to 
ease the situation in Bosnia where the Serb forces had embarked on their 
notorious ethnic cleansing campaign. In 1992 summer, the world was shaken 
with a refugee problem of an immense nature. The number of refugees was 
appallingly high. Perhaps two million inhabitants of the former Yugoslav 
republics had been displaced by fighting, more than a million from Bosnia 
alone. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter UNHCR) 
as well as a number of international observers were now convinced that Serbia 
was issuing passports and forcibly evicting people, especially Bosnians, as 
part of its ‘ethnic cleansing’ operation. Apparently, this was only the tip of 
the iceberg. Much worse was to come to light soon.
In August 1992 Western journalists and television reporters discovered a Serb 
detention camp in Central Bosnia for mainly Moslem civilian prisoners, which 
gave rise to speculation that a full-scale genocide oi Moslems was underway. 
The public outcry became so strong after these revelations that the Western 
governments thought ‘something must be done’. However, Britain and the US 
still firmly held on to their previous positions that any large-scale military 
intervention was out of the question. Since they insisted on their diagnosis 
that what was happening in Bosnia was, after all, a civil war, they turned a
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blind eye to the Bosnian government’s appeals for the lifting of the arms 
embargo unilaterally on Bosnian forces. In order to justify their reluctance 
to do anything militarily, they made up legends about the invincibility of the 
Serbs. According to those stories, the terrain made the Serbs invincible, and 
the Serbs allegedly had pinned down a number of German divisions in Bosnia 
during the course of the Second World War, a claim which does not appear to 
have been born out by historical research. Under these circumstances, any 
military suggestion that the latest technology, particularly combat helicopters 
and surgical strike capability of air force would finish off the Serbs in a short 
period of time fell on deaf ears. Instead, Western governments were trying to 
find a solution to the conflict through negotiations which, in reality, was 
assisting the Serbs in their bid for a ‘Greater Serbia’ by providing them with
extra time. 30
In August 1992, a joint EU-UN conforence was convened in London. I'he 
conference obtained a promise from Serb leaders to lift the sieges of Bosnian 
towns including Sarajevo and to withdraw their heavy weapons under UN 
supervision, declared a no-fly zone over Bosnia, decided on a tightening ol 
UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and replaced Lord Carrington 
with Lord Owen as one of the chairmen of the EU-UN-sponsored conference
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on the former Yugoslavia based in Geneva. But the London conference did 
not lead to an improvement of the situation on the grourid. The Serb sieges in 
Bosnia remained while the no-fly zone continued to be openly flouted by the 
Serbs, the only party with an air force. In short, the London conference 
revealed the full extent of the impotent passivity of Western policy towards 
the Bosnian conflict. Though humanitarian efforts by governments and 
international agencies grew in volume and helped relieve local sufferings, the 
dispatch of UN peacekeeping troops made no change to the situation on the 
ground except for making outside intervention less likely due to the possibility 
that UN troops might, as a result, become hostages. In October 1992, Lord 
Owen and Cyrus Vance, co-chairmen of the EU-UN conference on 
Yugoslavia, produced the first draft of what eventually, by .January 1993, grew 
into a set of proposals for dividing Bosnia into a number oI autonomous
provinces - the Vance-Owen plan.
“Although the first version of the Vance-Owen plan, 
unveiled in October 1992, did contain some clauses about 
the safe return of refugees to their homes, the concessions it 
made to local powers in the system of ‘cantons’ it envisaged 
(even the police force would be locally, not centrally, 
controlled) made it impossible to imagine that ethnic 
cleansing would be reversed. The second version of the 
plan, released in .lanuary 1993, took a further, fateful step: it 
assigned ‘ethnic’ labels (Serb, Muslim, Croat) to the various 
cantons. This was an open endorsement of ethnic 
separation, and a major factor in the outbreak of serious 
fighting one month later in central Bosnia between Muslims 
and Croats, who wanted to secure ‘their’ respective 
territories.”31
2.4. Bosnian War and the US poIicy(l992-1993)
From the very beginning of the Bosnian war, two basic failures of the West 
shaped the war’s future: one was a failure of policy (largely of absence) ; the 
other was a failure of understanding. Once the diagnosis was made wrongly, 
then the cure would not heal the illness. Since many Western governments 
tended to regard it as a ‘civil war’ caused by the hatred supposedly endemic 
among Yugoslav peoples going back to ‘thousands of years’, the measures 
they tried to take were bound to be all ineffective. Because if it was a civil 
war, then all the parties to the conflict must be treated as equally bad and 
guilty. Therefore, there would be no victims or aggressors. Though in reality, 
the defender in the war was not just an ethnic group but a democratically- 
elected government, containing Muslims, Croats, and the Serbs, this was 
treated as an unfortunate detail by most Western policy-makers. The weird 
thing was that, though the international community had demanded that each 
former Yugoslav republic respected internal borders as one of the 
requirements for recognition, neither Washington nor any other Western 
government was now prepared to offer the legitimate government of Bosnia 
any support to defend its own. “
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Given that Bosnia did not have an army, a military tradition or weapons, and 
that the international arms embargo on the whole of ex-Yugoslavia adopted by 
the UNSC on 25 September 1991, was resolutely adhered to by the West even 
after Bosnia became independent, the government in Sarajevo had little 
chance to build up its own forces as a deterrent to the violent secession of the 
Karadzic’s forces.
Despite continuous press reports about ‘ethnic cleansing’ Western 
governments preferred to keep their silence.
“Military advisors told President Bush, a definitive response 
to the bloodshed in Bosnia, which would be completed 
before election day, was not available. So Bush struck a 
pose of indifference and remained aloof even when reality 
introduced. In August 1992, after Newsday published 
eyewitness accounts of systematized murder in Serb 
concentration camps. Bush expressed shock but went on to 
describe the war - incorrectly - as a blood feud arising from 
ancient animosities. To justify his inaction, Bush revised 
history ‘Balkan politicians do it all the time’. At home his 
statements added confusion to the public debate, but in 
Belgrade, the Serbian capital, the sophisticated political 
operators managing the war got the message. George Bush 
was using their rhetoric.
Though almost impossible to ignore public reaction after television stations 
showed the reported Serb artillery attacks on city dwellers in a bakery queue.
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President Bush was engrossed in upcoming elections. So the statements from 
the White House sometimes were in zigzags. For instance, James Baker said 
in London on May 23 1992 that, should political, diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against Serbia fail to halt the war, military measures could be 
considered.^"* Yet the State Department had held consistently that military 
intervention was not under considerations. Political analysts simply attributed 
this ‘undiplomatically sharp attack’ by James Baker to Boutros-Ghali’s 
statements a week before, saying that it was impractical for the UN to provide 
military escorts for aid convoys bound for Sarajevo. All of that was indication 
that the US policy - or lack of it - was fluctuating. The US administration 
appeared more concerned as to how to react to the continual flow of 
disquieting news streaming out of Bosnia rather than to react to the events on
the ground.35
Therefore, appeasement became the order of the day in Washington as in 
London and various other capitals. On June 8, 1992, the UN SC unanimously 
agreed to send 1100 more UN troops to Yugoslavia to reopen Sarajevo airport 
and enable relief supplies to reach the city. But even this operation could have 
begun only when an effective cease-fire had been achieved. And in 
Washington, the White House spokesman, Martin Fitzwater, dismissed as
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mere rumor reports circulating in the Bosnian media that the US and its allies 
were drawing up contingency plans to airlift food and medicine to Sarajevo, 
should the negotiations aimed at reopening the airport under UN control fail. 
Three days later. President Bush declared that the deployment o f US troops in 
Bosnia was out of the question ‘because we are not the world’s policemen.’^^  
lie concluded that he was concerned about the situation in Yugoslavia; but he 
remained non-committal. He said his policy aim was to safeguard human life, 
and that he could work towards that end in a humanitarian way in cooperation 
with the UN.
His reluctance to use force in an election year was strongly backed by the 
Pentagon. His senior advisors in the National Security Council were also 
against military intervention, drawing a distinction between peace-keeping 
once a cease-fire was agreed between Serb and other forces on the ground and
the much riskier business of making peace.
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It appears that towards the end of .lune, the arguments against intervention 
were as strong as ever. True, .lames Baker, described Serb attacks on Bosnian 
capital as ‘an absolute outrage’ and ‘inhuman’; yet he still cautioned against 
intervention.·^** According to some press reports, in the last week of .lune.
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the possibility of a US military strike in the Balkans was seriously considered 
after President Bush held the first top-level meeting of advisors at the White 
House to consider military intervention. In Washington, James Baker, Brent 
Scowcroft, Colin Powell and Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney,
“were among those who joined Bush to discuss what a 
White House source later described as the US’s broad range 
o f ‘options for an expanded role’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 
the meeting. Baker and Scowcroft expressed enthusiasm for 
US military intervention but Cheney and Powell remained 
adamantly opposed.”39
In this top-level meeting, there was probably a long search within the Bush 
administration for a short and sharp US military engagement which could win 
back for Bush all the credit he gained temporarily after the Gulf war. But with 
Cheney and Powell opposing, any military engagement appeared too risky in 
an election year. As a top White House official put it: “ there are currently no 
serious plans to put ‘any real number ol Americans on the ground’ in the 
Yugoslav republics and that US efforts - in the immediate future, at least - will 
be confined to playing a major role in humanitarian relief”'^ '* From this point 
onwards, the US policy-makers began to focus on the US role in a 
humanitaricin intervention. And the military intervention of a real nature will 
go more and more into the background. For example, when on June 29, 1992
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the UNSC ordered more than 1000 UN troops to secure Sarajevo airport for 
humanitarian flights, British Prime Minister John Major urged President Bush 
to be cautious in the use of military force. Taking this advise, the Bush 
administration said that the US would support military intervention only to 
relieve Sarajevo, should it become necessary. Marlin Fitzwater at the White 
House, sounded even more cautious when he said that the US role would 
probably be restricted to providing logistical support and equipment.""
Confusion among the policy-making circles in Washington even as to how to 
contribute to a humanitarian intervention appeared quite prevalent. On July 7 
Brent Scowcroft said that it would be necessary to send ground convoys 
prepared to defend themselves if attacked, while the very next day. President 
Bush said that the US could do something, should NAIO decide to act. But 
he ruled out committing US ground troops. Following those statement, James 
Baker told Milan Panic, the Prime Minister-designate ol the rump Yugoslav 
state that the world still demanded ‘deeds from Yugoslavia not just words’ 
about halting the bloodshed in Bosnia. He demanded full compliance with 
UNSC resolutions requiring all forces fighting in Bosnia to submit to the 
authority of the Bosnian government and to surrender to international
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observers of heavy weapons handed to the Serbs by the JNA.''^ In the absence 
of any credible threat, all these, however, were to remain empty words.
In August, the world public was shocked again, this time, by the death camps 
and the first television pictures of emaciated prisoners. The Acting Secretary 
of State, Lawrence Fiagleburger who had just replaced James Baker on 5 
August 1992, said that the US was taking immediate action against Serbia for 
‘war crimes’; the action came in the form of a US call for an emergency 
meeting of the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Commission to act on reports 
that Bosnian civilians were being rounded up into concentration camps and 
executed.'*^ At this stage. President Bush came under attack by his 
presidential rival, Mr. William Clinton who drew comparisons with the 
Second World War atrocities and said that “if the horrors of the holocaust 
taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralysed in the 
face of genocide. US may have to use military lorce. I would begin with air 
power against the Serbs to restore the basic conditions ol humanity”.'*"'
Reports of brutality in concentration camps had now provoked an outcry in 
the US. All of that forced President Bush to do something at least outwardly. 
He demanded that UNSC adopts a resolution that would authorize the
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international community to use force, if necessary, to deliver humanitarian 
relief supplies, a proposal resisted by Britain and France which underlined the 
US-Europe split on Bosnia. On August 7, President Bush summed up his 
position. He said that the genocide and concentration camps of the Second 
World War must not be repeated; but clinging to his argument, he said that “I 
do not want to see the US bogged down in anyway into some guerrilla 
warfare. There is a lot of voices out there in the US that say ‘use force’, but 
they do not have the responsibility for sending someone else’s son or daughter 
in harm’s way. 1 do.”“*"^ One other difficulty for President Bush to worry about 
now was that Republican leaders were publicly divided over what to do in 
Bosnia, with interventionists and isolationists united only in blaming the West 
Europeans for failing to stop the conflict.^^’
After losing the presidential elections to Arkansas governor William Clinton 
in November, the Bush Administration with just tew weeks left in office 
began making efforts to contain the conflict in Bosnia. It had now become 
increasingly determined to end Serbian violations ot the UN no-fly zone over 
Bosnia by military aircraft. Therefore in mid-December, the US toughened its 
stance against Serbia and said that it would demand enforcement of a military 
‘no-fly zone’ over Bosnia. William Clinton, the President-elect, may have
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contributed to this sharpening of Bush’s views. Towards the end of December 
1992, the US made a shift in its policy vis-a-vis Bosnia, following a high-level 
strategic reappraisal by the State Department officials. Despite continuing 
resistance by the US military establishment to become involved in another 
war, both Bush administration offieials and foreign policy representatives of 
President-elect Clinton now appeared convinced that the US must enter the 
conflict, and if necessary, join British, French and other UN peace-keeping 
troops there. In a dramatic turn-around from his previous eautious utterances, 
Lawrence Eagleburger even went as far as to accuse Serbian President 
Milosevic of being a war criminal who should face trial for ‘crimes against 
humanity’.'^ * This alarmed both the British and Freneh governments who 
feared that because there was no US military presenee in Bosnia, British and 
French troops might become targets in Serbian retaliations against the 
Amerieans.
1992 ended with all those question marks and no clear-cut policies. This, of 
course, affected the year 1993 which had a new US president and the same 
ongoing problems. “With the Bush administration the reluctance to consider 
force was anehored in Vietnam; with the Clinton team there was a general 
uneasiness about the use of military power as an instrument of policy”.''^
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CHAPTER III
CONTINUATION OF WAR IN BOSNIA AND THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, 1993.
3.1. The Situation on the Cround in Bosnia at the Beginning 
of 1993.
1993 will probably be remembered as a year wasted in protracted and 
‘sophisticated’ negotiations while the tragedy on the ground in Bosnia 
continued unabated. Europe now looked all too willing to turn a blind eye to 
the ongoing genocide while the US with a new government was in zigzags 
which disappointed the Bosnians and put them into a more difficult position. 
It seemed as if the world with its eyes closed was waiting a solution which 
would come about by a touch of magic. I’his, in practical terms, meant that a 
quick solution was acceptable. However, this could not be achieved by a 
magic touch, but rather by a quick Serb victory, overrunning the whole of 
Bosnia. It also seemed as if the international community, especially the 
European countries above all Britain was resigned to accept that ultimate 
solution to be dictated by Serb forces regardless of how inhuman and unjust it 
might be.'
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The year 1993 started with the peace talks in Geneva regarded by the UN as 
the last chance to negotiate a halt to the war. The UN plan, prepared by Cyrus 
Vance and Lord Owen, proposed to divide Bosnia into ten self-governing 
provinces; Sarajevo would be an ‘open city’ in which all three ethnic groups 
would be represented, and although it preserved on paper a unified Bosnian 
state, it gave almost no power to the central government to keep the country 
together. There was little in the plan to stop the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats voting to join Serbia and Croatia propers, leaving the three small 
Muslim regions in an untenable position. According to the plan. The Serbs 
would have control over about half of the republic - much more than pre-war 
Serb population in Bosnia would warrant, but less than the Serb forces held at 
the time in 1993. It then divided the remainder between the Muslims and
Croats. Freedom of movement was to be assured and UN troops would patrol
2
‘corridors’ linking various provinces and ethnic areas.“
Though the authors of the plan argued for long that the deal they drew was the 
only chance for peace, no-one in Bosnia, except the Croats, was prepared to 
sign on. The Serbs, in their haydays in the absence of any credible threat from 
the international community to stop them, tended to see it as a ruse to roll
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back their ‘conquests’, since they were at the time in control of 70 percent of 
Bosnia. Therefore, Serb military urged its political leadership not to yield to 
diplomatic pressure. The Serb logic appeared simple: the international
community would, one way or the other, have to swallow the facts on the 
ground that the Serbs had won the war. The Anglo-American split over the 
use of force in Bosnia with Britain sticking to a policy of appeasement of the 
aggressor certainly emboldened the Serbs in their resistance to the plan. Not 
that the Bosnians were satisfied with it. According to the Bosnian leadership, 
the Vance-Owen peace plan rewarded ethnic cleansing, threatening to wipe 
Bosnia out of the map. d’hey pointed out with justice that such a plan, if 
insisted upon, would offer the break-away Serb and Croat units a golden 
opportunity to vote for union with ‘mother states’, Serbia and Croatia. And in 
such a contingency the Moslems together with urban Serbs and Croats who 
persistently expressed the wish to stay and even fight with their Moslem 
neighbors would be confined to isolated 'ghettos. Bosnian leadership had, 
therefore, no other choice than to fight on under extremely difficult 
circumstances. The only party in Bosnia which seemed satisfied with the plan 
was the Bosnian Croats who were to have been given larger chunks of 
territories than their pre-war population in Bosnia would justify with the
ultimate aim of uniting with Croatia proper.'3
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While the plan was presented as the last alternative to the use of Western 
military force, the presentation of it to the parties escalated the fighting. This 
was because of the fact that the plan envisaged ‘ethnic’ cantons, the most 
important defect of the whole plan. For instance, while the efforts were going 
on to persuade Karadzic to accept the Geneva plan, the war in Bosnia 
escalated as “Croatian forces stepped up a double-prolonged offensive to 
regain Serb-held territory in Southwest Croatia and capture fresh turfs from 
Muslims further east in Bosnia.”"^ To implement it would have required 
considerable military forces and expertise. To link the regions with 
internationally supervised corridors meant a huge new deployment of UN 
troops, meaning, in turn, that the US should be persuaded to put in large 
number of ground troops.'^
Meanwhile the mediators were becoming uneasy about the US stand on the 
peace plan. They were worried that the Clinton administration was more and 
more serious about the use of force. The deeper concern was that the new US 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher and his team appeared to be 
questioning the whole basis of the Vance-Owen plan.^’ US officials apparently 
argued with justice that the proposal to divide Bosnia into 10 semi­
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autonomous provinces under a weak central government would lead to the 
gradual partition of the republic, thus meeting the central Serb and Croat war 
aims. ’ In addition, the US appeared to be frustrated with the way the 
international mediators were handling the Serbs.® While Lord Owen and 
Cyrus Vance were molly-coddling the Bosnian Serb leaders and President 
Milosevic, the Clinton administration seemed determined to prosecute those 
responsible for war crimes in former Yugoslavia, despite the misgivings of 
European allies such as Britain. In one of his first policy initiatives since 
taking office, Warren Christopher instructed senior State Department advisers 
to investigate how best to organize an international war crimes tribunal. In 
another sign of a tougher US approach, Warren Christopher submitted a report 
to the UN on human rights violations in Bosnia, based on information 
gathered by US intelligence agencies. The report was intended for use by a 
future tribunal. Under the US plan. President Milosevic and the Serbian 
leader in Bosnia, Karadzic, were among those who might face trial for war 
crimes. The US also appeared willing to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. 
The Administration officials were even floating the idea of ending the arms 
embargo on Bosnia coupled with tightening of economic sanctions on Serbia. 
This was probably the first indication of what was in store: ^  the US could not
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swallow the Vance-Owen plan; but it might perhaps warm up to it gradually if 
it was subjected to major modifications.
It soon became clear that the Clinton administration was moving towards 
support for a modified version of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia. This in 
turn meant that the US had dropped plans for an independent US initiative to 
end the conflict. Though it continued to express opposition to the Vance- 
Owen plan as a whole, it seemed that the US was to ask for inclusion in the 
plan certain provisions for Bosnia’s overall territorial integrity and tougher 
guarantees for the maintenance of that. Ironically, however, this US revision 
of the plan eliminated all the chances for military action as President Clinton, 
on the advise of his defence secretary, Les Aspin, and under pressure from 
London and Paris, backed away from various military options he had 
previously urged on his predecessor, George Bush. In practical terms, all this 
vacillation in the US amounted to ruling out an ‘Operation Mountain Storm’ 
in Bosnia. It also meant that the US had sort of conceded defeat at the hands 
of other NATO allies, France and Britain in particular, in its endeavors to use 
intensive bombing raids to halt Serb expansionism. Concerned that air strikes 
could endanger the safety of Western peace-keepers on the ground, the US 
disappointed the advocates of early and substantial bombing. It soon emerged
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that those in the Pentagon and the Congress who had advocated a sweeping air 
offensive to take out every Serb gun emplacement around Sarajevo and the 
other Muslim ‘safe areas’ and to target Serb military and political leaders and 
their headquarters, had lost out to more moderate council.'*^
All of that left the Muslims with no illusions that the Americans could do a 
little more than exert pressure for some minor territorial revisions; but that 
they should not expect the US to roll back Serb gains altogether. Indeed, the 
EU and the US made it clear to Izzetbegovic that he would have to accept 
whatever was the result of the plan. Once Europe and America had decided 
against military intervention in Yugoslavia, it was inevitable that any peace 
plan would have to be largely on Serbian terms. Oddly enough, this plan was 
to be rejected by the Bosnian Serbs after it was accepted by the Bosnian 
government under considerable international pressure.
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3.2. Formulation of ‘Lift and Strike’ by the US and 
Europeanization of US Policy
The Serb rejection of the plan in April 1993, galvanized the US once more 
into action. Serb rejection called European arguments for non-intervention 
into question and gave credibility to President Clinton’s arguments for 
intervention. At the same time, it made it clear that the Serbs would continue 
to defy the international community and refuse any settlement offered by the 
mediators until and unless the world was prepared to use force. The US 
policy of ‘lift and strike’ came about when the US concluded that alternatives 
to using force had run out.
The idea of the ‘lift’ was to exempt the Bosnian government from the arms 
embargo to enable them to acquire arms to even the balance. This would be 
carried out in the hope that they would be able to achieve a stalemate on the 
battlefield which would then induce the Serbs to negotiate with them 
seriously. The other element, the ‘strike’, was to hold out the threat of the use 
of air power, particularly against the Serbs, if they violated various UN 
resolutions. For instance, at the time the policy was formulated, the Serbs
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were reportedly obstructing the delivery of relief convoys in Bosnia in 
violation of UNSC resolutions, fhe idea was that air power in particular 
might be applied against any forces that were to be used against relief convoys 
or the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops assigned with ensuring the 
delivery of relief supplies."
The American plan for ‘lift and strike’ was unveiled by Warren Christopher 
during his trip to Europe in May 1993 after the Serbs’ rejection of the Vance- 
Owen plan.'" Christopher’s intent was to convince the European capitals to 
join the US in lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and, 
if necessary, launching air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets during an 
interim period while the Bosnians integrated the weaponry to be given to 
them. To Christopher’s dismay, however, the British and the French opposed 
lifting the arms embargo because they feared that more arms might lead to a 
larger war possibly by drawing the Yugoslav army, which had become the 
army of Serbia proper, into the conflict, and thereby expand it, engulfing 
Serbia and then Croatia into a larger war. It might also put the British and 
French forces on the ground in former Yugoslavia in considerable danger, and 
they might have to be evacuated beforehand. This would necessarily cut off 
any further deliveries of humanitarian aid. At this point, the multilateral
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element came to the fore. All these arguments pertained to the air strikes. Air 
strikes against Serbian targets might lead the Serbs to retaliate against Western 
forces on the ground or turn these forces into hostages. This would bring 
about ground force involvement by the Western powers, either individually or 
by NATO or the UN in order to rescue the Western forces and thereby suck 
NATO and the UN into a full-scale undesirable ground war in Bosnia.'^
The allied rejection of this plan was no doubt a serious set back for President 
Clinton and served no other purpose than to illustrate the deep divergence in 
approach between the US and its European allies over Bosnia.
“Yet some of the blame for the failure of the Christopher 
mission lay in the administration approach to the idea of 
allied consultations. Christopher went to Europe ‘in a 
listening mode’. Instead of forcefully presenting the 
American preference, he sought to solicit allied views. Had 
Christopher been more forceful and insisted in presenting 
the US position, the allies might have eventually grudgingly 
agreed to it. Instead he sought to solicit their views and test 
the water. Christopher was thus forced to return home 
empty-handed”. ' 4
In summing up this ‘exchange of views’ with the Europeans allies, former 
Assistant Seeretary o f Defense, Riehard Perle stated, “it was an exehange all 
right: Warren Christopher went to Europe with an Ameriean poliey and eame 
baek with a European one.” ''^  The European rejeetion of ‘lift and strike’
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significantly undercut Clinton’s credibility, both domestically and 
internationally though it ironically provided a convenient excuse for inaction. 
“Having made allied support and participation an essential precondition for 
military action, which he knew would be unpopular and divisive,” it allowed
the President to essentially put the blame on the allies. 16
Warren Christopher’s failed mission of May, 1993, and continual pernicious 
effects of this failure were to constitute the defining crisis of American policy 
in Bosnia. From then onwards, rather than asserting its traditional leadership 
role and overcoming European objections to US policy proposals, the Clinton 
Administration began to capitulate to European views and redefine the conflict 
in terms that Europe found far more convenient. For instance, within only a 
few days of his return from Europe, Warren Christopher signed on to the 
European and Russian ‘Joint Action Program’. Now what had been the 
Europeans’ alternative proposals to ‘lift and strike’ - specifically, designating 
six remaining Bosnian enclaves as ‘safe areas’ subject to better UN protection 
- actually became the US policy. One month later, after intense lobbying by 
its Joint Action partners - Britain, France, Russia, and Spain (then in the UN 
Security Council presidency) - the US Administration agreed not to work for 
passage of a UNSC resolution to end the arms embargo, despite its vocal
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public opposition to the weapons ban. While the administration itself voted to 
lift it, lack of active American leadership to obtain additional support doomed
the measure to failure. 17
The rejection of the lift and strike proposal by the allies in May, 1993, also led 
to a shift in the US approach to the negotiations. In effect the US adopted a 
policy of ‘benign neglect’ and decided to let the negotiations in Geneva play 
themselves out. At the same time, the Administration sought to downplay the 
importance of Bosnia and keep it out of the front burner. What had initially 
been touted as vital American interest in February 1993, now came to be 
described as a “human tragedy’ about which the US could do very little.'**
Meanwhile, following their rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the Serbs 
became more and more defiant; co-chairman Cyrus Vance resigned and retired 
from the Balkan negotiations. Thorvald Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian 
Prime Minister, was appointed as the co-chairman ol the Steering Committee 
and together with Lord Owen they prepared a second proposal. This new plan 
later became known as the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. According to that, the 
borders of Bosnia would remain, but the country would be divided among the 
Serbs, Muslims and Croats. The three ethnic regions would be tied together in
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a very loose confederation. In effect, this meant partitioning of Bosnia. 
Negotiations over the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal consumed most of the 
second half of 1993.'^ If accepted, depending on how it was to be interpreted 
and implemented, the plan could serve only to ratify most of the Serbian 
territorial conquests and lead to Bosnia’s demise as a unified multi-ethnic 
democracy. The Serbian dominated republic would receive 42 per cent of the 
territory and the Bosnian Muslim republic 31 per cent; and the Croatian 
republic 17 per cent. From this point onwards, this plan was to remain the 
world community’s basic formula for resolution of the Bosnian conflict 
despite some minor modifications introduced in June 1994 by the Contact 
Group to be composed of representatives of the UN and the US, Russian,
French, British, and German governments. 20
When the Owen-Stolteiiberg plan also failed through the Serbs’ rejection, the 
next alternative was suggested by Lord Owen named as the global solution of 
the Bosnian question. In this plan, he approached all the factions and all the 
contending groups for a compromise. There was a promise of greater shares 
for each one of them if they cooperated in this global solution. He argued that 
instead of solving each problem individually, the conllict, dealt with globally, 
would produce a better and lasting solution. The net outcome of these new
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efforts only helped to consolidate the Serbian gains and provided an advantage 
for Serbs. This approach also tended to legitimize the land acquisition 
through force and occupation in order to bring some resemblance of peace to 
the area. In time, different groups began to make new plans that were either 
within the framework of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan or Owen’s ‘global 
solution plan’. According to the new proposed plans, Bosnia was to be divided 
into three parts, of which two would join with Croatia and Serbia because of 
their population compositions.
While all these negotiations were going on, military situation on the ground in 
Bosnia remained largely unchanged during 1993. Fighting between the 
Muslims and the Croats broke out in central and southern Bosnia in the spring 
of 1993 and continued into early the following year. This fighting was marked 
by ethnic cleansing and atrocities similar to those that had taken place in areas 
seized by the S e r b s . I ’he Serbs, on the other hand, consolidated their 
positions by widening the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina in the west and 
Semberija in the east, and by seizing the strategic town of Trnovo, which had 
linked Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia. In August of 1993, the Serbs also 
managed to push the Bosnian Muslims off Mt. Bjelasnica and Mt. Igman, 
raising fears that the siege of Sarajevo would be intensified. Earlier, in April,
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Serb forces had launched an attack on the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and 
Zepa. A last minute agreement with the UN created a safe area around 
Srebrenica. This was to be followed by a UNSC resolution which established 
a total of six safe areas ; Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and 
Zepa.
Towards the end of the year, it seemed as if the appeasement triumphed all 
over Europe, particularly in Britain. The mediators were all too eager to alter 
their peace plans in accordance with the wishes of the aggressor, and each 
alteration was to be hailed by Europeans as a last chance to stop the 
‘violence’, a term which they used extensively to describe the war in Bosnia. 
The US came up with a comprehensive plan, ‘lift and strike’, which would 
have put things in order in Bosnia had it been put into practice; but the Clinton 
Administration gave in to the Europeans too easily and too quickly. From 
then onwards, the US policy was to drift up to late summer 1995. 
Nevertheless, the US never ruled out the use of force as the Europeans did 
during those two years.
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CHAPTER IV
BEGINNING OF SERB REVERSES AND THE US POLICY, 1994.
The beginning of 1994 did not offer much ground for optimism about the 
situation. The uncertainty was going on and the peace was still far away from 
grasp. I'he UN’s mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg summed up the situation by 
saying that the atmosphere for peace talks was more negative than at any time 
since he accepted the post in the spring of 1993. Indeed, the fighting between 
the Croats and the Bosnians were continuing with no sign o f abating. The 
situation between these former allies had almost reached a point of no-return 
by the end of 1993. Following some initial setbacks, the Bosnians got the 
upper hand in the battlefield against the Croats. Towards the end of the year 
1993, the Croats’ defeat by the Moslems had became almost a certainty; the 
Croatian President Tudjman began to threaten the Bosnians that Croatia would 
intervene in Bosnia in order to help the embattled Croat forces there.'
Serbia’s President Milosevic had emerged from general elections as remaining 
by far the most powerful politician in former Yugoslavia, but his room for 
maneuver was narrowing. In Croatia, the rebel Serbian minority leadership 
had slipped out of his control. It was doubtful whether he was still able to
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strike a deal with Croatian President Tudjman on the status of the Serbs in 
Croatia. Likewise in Bosnia, it was far from certain that he could get the 
Bosnian Serb leadership to make territorial concessions as required by the 
West as a prelude to a comprehensive peace. Inside Serbia, hyper-inflation 
had reached the highest in the world since the Weimar Republic. Economic 
collapse was almost total; mass poverty was spreading, and an alternative cast
of populists and nationalists awaited President Milosevic’s departure from the
2scene.
Indecisive Western policies were going on. In January, a spokesman for 
Boutros-Ghali ruled out the threat of using NATO planes to force the Serbs to 
give the UN humanitarian access to the Muslim ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica and 
open Tuzla airport to international aid flights. Boutros-Ghali asked his 
political representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, to prepare a report on the 
feasibility of deploying NATO planes to force the Serbs to cooperate with the 
UN aid efforts. Meanwhile Lord Owen, the EU mediator, dismissed 
suggestions that the threat of airstrikes could force the Bosnian Serbs to be 
more flexible in the partition talks.
“By the time of the NATO summit in Brussels in January, 
1994, roles had become so utterly reversed that ITance was 
able to assume the mantle of leadership in NATO by calling
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had reached the highest in the world since the Weimar Republic. Economic 
collapse was almost total; mass poverty was spreading, and an alternative cast
of populists and nationalists awaited President Milosevic’s departure from the
2scene.
Indecisive Western policies were going on. In January, a spokesman for 
Boutros-Ghali ruled out the threat of using NATO planes to force the Serbs to 
give the UN humanitarian access to the Muslim ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica and 
open Tuzla airport to international aid flights. Boutros-Ghali asked his 
political representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, to prepare a report on the 
feasibility of deploying NATO planes to force the Serbs to cooperate with the 
UN aid efforts. Meanwhile Lord Owen, the EU mediator, dismissed 
suggestions that the threat o f airstrikes could force the Bosnian Serbs to be
3more flexible in the partition talks.
“By the time of the NATO summit in Brussels in January, 
1994, roles had become so utterly reversed that France was 
able to assume the mantle of leadership in NATO by calling
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for airstrikes to halt Serbian attacks around Sarajevo. The 
US administration followed France’s lead. As always 
throughout the conflict, France’s motivation in seeking this 
threat was not to promote a just peace by reversing or even 
halting Serbian aggression, but rather to obtain a quick 
settlement. Indeed, France had, until then, been a leading 
opponent of air action.”'^
Washington’s policy of benign neglect had, in the meantime, provoked new 
strains with both France and Britain, who sought to get the US to play a more 
active diplomatic role in the peace process. The French and the British were 
particularly irked by the US refusal to put greater pressure on the Bosnian 
Muslims to accept the plans for partition, which they viewed as the main 
obstacle to a settlement. The US, in turn, felt that the Europeans were all too 
ready to accept ‘peace at any price’ and that their approach smacked of 
appeasement. Initially the US resisted this pressure, both on moral grounds 
that the Bosnian Muslims were victims and that any peace settlement had to 
be acceptable to them and out of concern for its relations with the Muslim 
world more broadly.^
But the mortar attack on the market place in Sarajevo in February 1994, 
killing sixty-eight people, led to a change in US’ stance. I he media attention 
was extremely high: this caused panic in the government and created the 
feeling that ‘something must be done.’
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The mortar attack had two prime results. First, it galvanized the US to get 
more actively involved in the peace negotiations and to throw its diplomatic 
weight behind a settlement. Second, it led to the ultimatum to the Serbs on 
February 10, threatening to use air strikes to prevent the Serb strangulation of 
Sarajevo. In effect, the ultimatum represented a tacit deal: the US would join 
the peace efforts in return for European - especially French and British - 
support for air strikes. Indeed, the ultimatum was largely attributable to 
French pressure and represented a fusion of French and American proposals. 
This threat of air strikes was very important in the sense that they came just 
after Lord Owen’s statement of ‘nobody but a fool wants air strikes’, speaking 
in Belgrade ( 7 Feb. 1994) on one o’clock news, BBC.
In the meantime the Bosnian Moslems had built up their army to nearly 
200.000. They had acquired fresh military equipment despite the UN arms 
embargo and received financial backing from some Moslem states. In central 
Bosnia the Moslems had been making territorial gains, mostly against the 
Croats, to the extent that Croatia was risking UN sanctions by sending 
Croatian regular troops to bolster the Bosnian Croat forces, 'fhough many 
governments remained unconvinced that air strikes would contribute to peace
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efforts in Bosnia, the wave of horrors that followed the shelling outrage in 
Sarajevo forced NATO to be seen to be taking action. Russia had in the 
meantime accused Boutros-Ghali o f exceeding his mandate by calling for 
airstrikes, and argued that a full meeting of the UNSC should take place first. 
That would give Russia the opportunity to veto air strikes.*
Within this cloudy atmosphere, NATO planes bombed some Serbian targets. 
This was a limited military operation to warn the Serbs to comply with the 
international decisions and stop their aggression. However, this was not to be 
followed by further military actions, which in turn encouraged the Serbs to 
continue their attacks on Srebrenica and Gorazde.‘^ Meanwhile, NATO had 
issued an ultimatum to the Serbs, demanding a NATO-defined heavy-weapons 
exclusion zone around Sarajevo. This injected NATO and, by implication, the 
US directly into the conflict. From then onwards, American diplomacy 
undertook open advocacy for the Muslim-led Bosnian government.
President Clinton held a press conference on February 21 and said that:
“ we intend to remain vigilant, fhe UN and NATO will 
continue to conduct intensive reconnaissance and 
monitoring of the Sarajevo area. The NATO decision 
stands. We will continue to enforce the exclusion zone. 
Any shelling of Sarajevo or the appearance of heavy
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weapons in the exclusion zone will bring a certain and swift 
response from the UN and NATO. Second, we are working 
to renew progress toward a negotiated solution among the 
parties. A workable, enforceable solution acceptable to all 
parties is the only way to ensure a lasting solution for 
Sarajevo and for all of Bosnia”. 10
4.1 The US Efforts To Bring the Moslems and the Croats 
Together
N Al'O’s apparent success in forcing the withdrawal o f heavy guns around 
Sarajevo constituted a breathing space which helped President Clinton to 
renew US efforts to achieve peace in Bosnia. The most important 
achievement in the Bosnian war account was one of the American initiative to 
bring the Moslems and the Croats together. This required heavy political 
pressure by the US on the Croatian Government of President Tudjman, 
threatening economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, should Zagreb reject 
it. The US also pressed Germany, the European ally closest to the Croats, to 
add its own weight to the campaign to push Croatia into talks. Given that 
Croatia always wanted to improve its position in the eyes of the Western 
countries, in particular Germany, and that from the very beginning of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, it wanted to be integrated to the West, this was a 
good opportunity for President Tudjman to reverse its bad image in the West.
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These efforts were soon to bear fruit. On 18 March 1994 in Washington DC, 
a Croat-Moslem Federation was formed. The federation agreement was a 
highly successful step in the peace process. First of all, it ended the war 
between Bosnia’s Croats and Muslims. It freed both parties from having to 
fight on two fronts. It turned the attention of the two warring factions against 
their common enemy, while winning formal commitments from them to 
constitutional arrangements to restore peace, promote interethnic coexistence, 
and inculcate democratic values and processes. Secondly it opened up the 
possibility for arms shipments to reach the Moslem forces via Croatian ports. 
For instance, in spring 1995, press reports were quoting the US 
Administration officials as confirming that the US had for sometime been 
ignoring shipments of arms from Iran bound for Croatia and being forwarded 
to Bosnia. Later the press also reported that the US had given Croatia an 
implicit green light to serve as a port ol entry. It seems likely that these arms 
played a role in helping the Bosnian Muslim forces stem, and, later, turn, the 
tide in their war with the Bosnian Serbs."
This federal plan differed in several important respects from the Owen- 
Stoltenberg partition. Though it provided for a high level of autonomy for 
each group, it was based on territorial unity, while, at the same time, retaining
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a strong and viable central government. The plan contained the highest level 
of human rights guarantees, as well as provisions for the independence of the 
judiciary. Founded on a far more realistic and workable division of power 
between the groups, and between executive and legislative branches of the 
government on both the local and federal levels, it created a more workable 
framework within which all Bosnians could operate peacefully.
The quality and strength of the federation were discussed by a number of 
experts whether it was a perfect federation or not and whether it could last 
long. This is debatable. But what was crucial indeed was the operativeness of 
the plan in destroying Serbian war plans and forcing them to accept peace 
proposals. For instance, the agreement to halt the fighting in Mostar and other
parts of Hercegovina between the Croats and Muslims was a blow to the
1 ^Serbs, since Milosevic’s strategy of divide and rule was thwarted.
Despite all efforts, the Serbs did not alter their attitude and in the latter part of 
Mareh 1994, they attacked Gorazde, a town supposedly one of the ‘safe areas’ 
under UN proteetion. This was a direct challenge by the Serbs to the UN 
forces. Renewed lighting in Gorazde in April led to a serious split between 
Britain and France on the one side, and the US on the other; there had been
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limited NATO action to try to stop the Serbs closing in on the town, and the 
UN contingent there was more or less held hostage. The attacks on Gorazde 
intensified the debate in the US between those who advocated an intensive 
bombing of Serb positions and those, mostly in the Defense Department, who 
were skeptical about the ability of air power to play a decisive role in Bosnia. 
Many military commanders feared that the use of air power would drag the 
US into an open ended conflict that could not be won militarily, except by the 
introduction of ground troops, a commitment they opposed vehemently, and 
one which the Administration had repeatedly ruled out. Many civilian experts 
on the other hand, argued that air power could be used to achieve limited 
objectives and provide an incentive for the Serbs to return to the negotiating 
table. They pointed out that the Serbs, including the Yugoslav Army, 
generally feared, and avoided battle with US forces. For example, in spring 
1993, when the prospects for US-led airstrikes appeared possible, the Serbs 
had backed off and agreed provisionally to the negotiation process. Then, as it 
became clear that a US military operation was not going to happen, they had 
got bolder. According to some observers, the fighting quality o f the Serbian 
forces and the real military threat they could pose to outside forces had been 
exaggerated. That was not to say, however, that the air power alone would 
provide an outright military victory, since small artillery, such as mortars.
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could be easily hidden, and heavy guns could be moved. Nevertheless, they 
argued with justice as the bombing campaign by NATO in 1995 clearly 
indicated air strikes could inflict substantial damage, which the Serbs would 
seek to avoid.
In addition, the Serb compliance with the February ultimatum initially seemed 
‘to vindicate the limited application of force’ school and demonstrated that 
when faced with a credible threat of use of force the Serbs would back down. 
However, the shelling of Gorazde now called this assumption into question, 
rekindling the debate. Many Pentagon officials now expressed doubt that the 
success of Sarajevo could be extended to protecting other Moslem safe 
havens. Their argument was that the situation in Gorazde and other Moslem 
safe havens was quite different from that in Sarajevo, and therefore, did not 
lend itself to the use of air power. These utterances by the Pentagon did little 
to persuade many civilian officials who resolutely maintained that airpower 
could achieve limited goals and provide important diplomatic leverage. The 
problem in Gorazde, they argued, was not the use of airstrikes but that too
little airpower was used too modestly. 13
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Administration officials were saying in March that the new Pentagon team of 
Mr. William Perry - Defense Secretary - and General John Shalikashvili - the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - was more flexible about using force for 
limited aims than their predecessors, Les Aspin and Colin Powell, and that the 
issue of expanding the use of air power to protect other Moslem enclaves was 
still open. But on April 5, General Shalikashvili said
“it did not make sense to employ air strikes to protect 
civilians in Gorazde. He cited the fact that in Sarajevo the 
Serbs were using heavy weapons that could be targeted by 
air strikes more closely than the small arms being employed 
around Gorazde. In addition, he said there were not enough 
UN peacekeepers to enforce any such ultimatum.” '4
An analysis of the debate as to whether to use airstrikes against the Serbs in 
Gorazde appears to suggest that the civilian and the military within the US 
administration fought on two levels: substantive and tactical. At one level, the 
debate focused on what military actions the US might take with its allies. 
Apparently one idea was the establishment of a ‘no fire’ zone around Gorazde 
in which Serbian guns that had been pounding the town with impunity would 
be subject to retaliatory air strikes. This option was discussed between UNSC 
and the US State Department officials. However, General Shalikashvili 
nipped in the bud all such plans by saying at a news conferenee that using
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airstrikes in the near future was out of the question. Beyond the debate over 
whether to use force, another level of disagreement came about: the wisdom 
of publicly playing down prospects for using force. In doing so, Pentagon 
officials were eager to point out they were just trying to clear with the 
Congress and the public about the limits of military power and avoid raising 
unrealistic expectations. But the State Department officials responded that 
Washington needed to keep open the possibility of air strikes to maintain 
leverage over the Serbs as the diplomats were trying to negotiate an end to the 
war. And public utterances ruling out the use of air force would serve no 
other purpose than encourage the Serbs to intensify their attacks. They also 
pointed out that the US and its allies had an obligation to protect the Bosnian 
towns that the UN has designated as safe areas. State Department officials 
pointed to an August 1993 resolution adopted by the NATO that threatened 
the use of airstrikes to lift the Bosnian Serbs’ sieges not only of Sarajevo, but 
of other areas.
All these efforts were to be complicated by a lack of decision from the 
commander of the UN peacekeeping troops as to what military steps he 
deemed necessary to protect Gorazde. Therefore, when the Serbs intensified 
their attacks on Gorazde on April 10th, Warren Christopher was quick to say
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that it was up to General Michael Rose to decide whether the situation on the 
ground warranted air strikes. And when the Serbs closed in on Gorazde, two 
US F-16s attacked the Serb forces acting for the first time on its long-standing 
threat to use air power to protect Bosnian towns designated as the UN safe 
havens. Officials at NATO headquarters in Brussels said that the operation 
brought an immediate halt to Serbian artillery fire.'^
But It was very important to note that the air attacks brought a new realism to 
the Bosnian Serbs who had brazenly tested the will of the international 
community and exploited every sign of hesitation and departmental infighting 
among Western governments. And President Clinton’s statements “while not 
committing the US to a broad role, left no doubt that US air power would be 
available if similar, narrowly defined attacks were requested in the future.”
Unfortunately those actions were still inadequate to stop the Serbian 
aggression. In late April, Bosnian Serbs shot down a British plane near 
Gorazde. Although the US made it clear to the UN and the NATO allies that 
Washington would continue to support the use of close air support and, if 
necessary, air strikes under current NATO authorization to protect 
peacekeepers in Gorazde, soon it came out that General Michael Rose had
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decided not to request immediate retaliatory air strikes for the downing of the 
British plane and that the Washington supported that decision.
All of this was indication that the US was being drifted away by events, and 
that Serb attacks in Bosnia were fostering more discussion, leading to 
departmental infighting within the US administration. And there appeared no 
end to these discussions, the continuation of which served no other purpose 
than embolden the Serbs. There was also indication that the differences of 
opinion between the US and its European allies were becoming so wide that 
under these circumstances the US with no clear policy option would continue 
to fluctuate from the use of force to doing nothing as the following events 
showed clearly. For instance, France, which had joined US in February in 
leading NATO ultimatum to the Serbs around Sarajevo, now made clear to the 
Clinton Administration that it had no desire to ask for new NAT O authority to 
punish the Serbs. Instead, France was seeking American support for a plan to 
revive a European initiative that envisioned the gradual lifting of sanctions 
against the Serbs and to put the US and Russia on ‘an equal footing’ in 
pressing for a negotiated settlement. Mr. Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign 
Minister, who was quick to endorse the French initiative offered to try to 
persuade the Serbs to accept a cease-fire in Bosnia and a resumption of the
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talks in exchange for a pledge of a limited lifting of sanctions. Instead of 
rejecting it, the US State Department indicated that the US would be willing to 
discuss how sanctions could be progressively lifted after a cease-fire was 
achieved, while Warren Christopher was reportedly opposed to what he called 
the premature lifting of sanctions, arguing with justice that the Serbs should 
not be rewarded until there was a genuine peace.
4.2. The Contact Group and the US
After the Gorazde fiasco, the Western countries formed a ‘Contact Group’ 
composed of the representatives of the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. The 
Group was set up not to continue direct, multilateral negotiations among the 
parties themselves, and bilateral negotiations between mediators and the 
parties. Instead, it was to promote negotiations among representatives of the 
great powers to find a plan that all would be willing to impose on the parties. 
The peace plan which the Contact group put together was the famous partition 
with 51 percent going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent to the 
Serbs. This plan was mostly prepared by the European members of the 
Contact Group, including Russia, and the US, however grudgingly, endorsed 
it.
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The initial US plan was apparently different from that. As Professor Ivo 
Banac in his article in the National Review‘d underlines, on May 14, 
Clinton’s pointman, Charles Redman, got the Moslems and Croats to agree on 
a map of Bosnian federation. According to this arrangement, Bosnian 
Moslems and Croats (jointly 55.31 per cent o f Bosnia’s population) would 
control 55 per cent of the land, to be divided into eight cantons (four Moslem, 
two Croat, and two joint), while the Bosnian Serbs ( 28.37 per cent of 
Bosnia’s population) would get, whether they joined the federation or not, 
with control of 42 per cent of the land, located in four separate areas, two of 
them contiguous with Serbia or Montenegro. The Bosnian capital of Sarajevo 
would form a separate district with 3 per cent of Bosnia’s territory. In short, 
the percentages were 58 to 42 against the Serbs. The map had the advantage 
of cutting out the Serb supply corridor at Brcko, without which the Serb 
domination of western Bosnia and the adjacent areas of Croatia could not be 
maintained. On May 13, the day before the agreement was signed, Warren 
Christopher effectively erased everything the US had accomplished in Vienna 
through the efforts of Charles Redman by accepting in Geneva the new plan of 
the so-called Contact Group which reduced the advantage of the Bosnian 
Croats’ and Muslims’ hold over the Bosnian Serbs to 51 -49 and dangled the
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possibility of a plebiscite for an “Anschluss” - Union - with Serbia within two
18years.
The signals from the parties about the proposed partition plan; 51-49 percent 
were not heart-warming. The Serbs rejected it on the grounds that it made 
them give up too much conquered territory. By the same token, the Moslem- 
Croat federation declared that the plan let the Serbs keep too much. President 
Milosevic pressed Karadzic to accept the proposal because he was desperate to 
win favor with the international community and remove the crippling UN 
sanctions which had brought Serbia’s economy to its knees. He went as far as 
to threaten to cut back the finance and weapons that kept Bosnian Serb rebels 
fighting if they rejected the plan. At this stage, in order to encourage all sides 
to accept the deal, the US expressed readiness to send a ‘significant number’ 
of troops to Bosnia if the peace plan won acceptance: US officials said that, if 
an agreement were to take hold. President Clinton would propose dispatching 
at least 15.000 US troops to make up about half a peacekeeping f o r c e . A t  
the same time, Washington also expressed readiness to accept an expanded 
military role in the event of renewed fighting. This was the first sign that the 
Administration was under strong pressure from the US Legislature to take a
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more active stance on Bosnia perhaps beginning with the lifting of the arms 
embargo on the Bosnian government.
4.3. The Congressional Support For Bosnia and the Clinton 
Administration
In August 1994 there was concerted pressure on the Bosnian Serb leaders to 
accept the peace plan. President Milosevic in order to prevent the sanctions 
on his country from becoming toughened urged the Bosnian Serbs to accept it. 
He said otherwise Serbia proper would have to consider severing its political 
and economic ties with them. But in an escalating power struggle among the 
Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs’ self-styled parliament in Pale rejected the plan, 
which put President Milosevic at odds with Karadzic and Mladic. President 
Milosevic even went as far as to accuse them of pursuing ‘insane political
ambitions’ and of being motivated with ‘greed’., 20
It was in this confused atmosphere that President Clinton issued his threat to 
the Bosnian Serbs, warning them that the US might have defy the international 
arms embargo unilaterally on Bosnian Government despite objections from its 
European allies. Though the White House still reacted positively to Serbia’s
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announcement that it was cutting off all ties with the Bosnian Serbs, it warned 
that it was high time to see deeds not just words. All o f this, however, fell on 
deaf ears and the US soon grasped that nothing was changing on the ground. 
This moved President Clinton to reverse his rejection of unilateralism from 
September and particularly October onwards and he threatened to lift the arms 
embargo after 15 October unless the Bosnian Serbs accepted the peace plan 
put forward by the Contact Group. It soon became clear that the US Congress 
was the most important factor in Clinton Administration’s new unilateral 
approach. Therefore, it is imperative to have a look at the Congress’ line 
during the process.
frue, the disagreement between the Clinton administration and the Congress 
on policy towards Bosnia was turning to harsh criticisms by the Congress by 
the late 1993. But, as an analysis of the history ol relations between Clinton 
Administration and the Congress would indicate, this disagreement was part 
of the general struggle for influence in policy-making between the Executive 
and the Legislature. For instance, although in late 1994 the Congress was 
pressing for unilateral actions by the US headed by the Senate republican 
leader Bob Dole; earlier in late 1993, the latter, then Senate minority leader of 
Kansas by an amendment wanted to limit the use of funds for military
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operations in Haiti without advance authorization from the Congress. And 
another amendment, sponsored by Sens. Don Nickles (R) of Oklahoma and 
Thad Cochran (R) of Mississippi, required that the US troops in a UN 
operation should serve only under US command.^'
In January 1994, Bob Dole in his article in the The New York Times 
explained the ‘peace powers act’ that he had just introduced which included 
principles like ‘prohibit US troops from serving under foreign command on 
UN operations’, ‘bar US forces from any standing UN army’, ‘ put congress in 
the loop...’. He conceded that his bill would not solve all the problems of 
‘subcontracting US policy to an over-ambitious UN’. Nevertheless, by 
making the Congress a full partner in major decisions, the act would ensure 
that “US foreign policy interests, soldiers and tax payers are better 
p r o t e c t e d . F r o m  May 1994 onwards the relation between the President and 
the Congress became strained on US policy towards Bosnia. On 12 May, the 
Senate demanded that the President breaks the UN embargo on arms supplies 
to Bosnia, even if that meant taking action alone. Though many of those who 
backed this change had been vocal opponents of sending US ground troops 
and even of authorizing US air strikes, they supported lifting the embargo so
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that the Bosnians rather than the Americans could defend Bosnia. But 
President Clinton opposed the proposal vehemently.
The irony was that lifting the Bosnian arms embargo was President Clinton’s 
preferred option all along only to be resisted and stopped in 1993 by strenuous 
British and French objections. At this new juncture, France, Britain and 
Russia viewed with alarm the prospect of the Senate forcing an American 
arms lift to the Bosnians. That, they maintained, would expose their troops to 
an intensified war. British officials were quick to emphasize that the Senate 
decision would not be binding on the President. Yet they conceded that it 
would increase pressure for far reaching change on the ground that might 
involve a withdrawal of all UN forces. France, the largest contributor to the 
UN Protection Force in Bosnia, subscribed to Britain’s view. According to 
these European arguments, by listening to Mr. Dole President Clinton would 
trigger a confrontation with Russia.
There was now clear indication that the President’s powers to stick to his 
‘Europeanized’ policy on Bosnia had eroded. He had by then run out of 
explanations why he was doing nothing in the face of an ongoing genocide 
and why he still expected the Europeans to take appropriate measures to stop
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the carnage when European implication in the whole war had been revealed by 
press reporting. Fearing that a Presidential veto would expose the President to 
similar charges, the US officials calculated that now was not the time for a 
confrontation with the Congress. Bob Dole in explaining his bill, proposing 
the lifting of the arms embargo by the US unilaterally said that:
“US action to lift this illegal and immoral arms embargo 
against Bosnia is long over due.23 This is an opportunity to 
do what is morally right and to demonstrate the global 
leadership that only the US can provide. It is time for the 
US to stop hiding behind the failed policies of the UN and 
start doing the right thing. The embargo is illegal. It was 
imposed on Yugoslavia, a country which no longer exists. 
And it violates article 51 of the UN charter, which 
guarantees the right of member nations, including Bosnia, to
self-defense.”24
The Bosnia pressure on Clinton grew when the bill was passed in the House of 
Representatives on June 9th. The House of Representatives voted to require 
the US to stop enforcing the UN arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia 
and to supply weapons to the Bosnian Moslem government, 'fhe vote, by 244 
to 178, did not have the force of law but it was a clear warning to the 
Administration. There was fierce exchanges among members of the House: 
Congressman Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, warned that it would merely aggravate the conflict in Bosnia 
while Congressman Jerrold Nadler countered that the embargo was ‘the
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handmaid of genocide’. The adopted bill required the President to terminate 
the US arms embargo on Bosnian government upon receipt from that 
government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self defense. It 
authorized the President to provide ‘appropriate military assistance’ and the 
transfer of up to 200 million US dollars worth of military equipment and 
training services to the Bosnian government. Although the Senate had also 
passed a similar resolution, its language was different, and identical versions 
would have to be passed in both chambers before the measure could become
law.25
Confronted with that. President Clinton said that he favored lifting the arms 
embargo on Bosnia but that he did not want to act unilaterally in defiance of 
the wishes of the European countries which provided the bulk oI the UN 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia. From then onwards the US policy began to 
fluctuate more from acting in collusion with the Europeans to an express 
support for the lifting of the arms embargo under pressure from the Congress. 
In fact, Russia, Western Europe and the US had agreed earlier in the summer 
of 1994 that they would consider lifting the embargo if Bosnia accepted the 
latest international peace plan and the Bosnian Serbs rejected it. But when 
that did in fact happen, Europe would not act on its promise, leading the US
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Senate to vote, as the House already had, to demand that the Clinton 
administration try to get the embargo lifted in the UNSC.^^ President Clinton 
aceordingly promised that unless the Serbs accepted peace terms by October 
15, he would seek UNSC approval for an end to the UN arms embargo against 
Bosnia. “If he fails to win worldwide support by November 15, he has told
27Congress, he will break the embargo on his own.”
In other words, as a well-known American Columnist put it,:
“Mr. Clinton’s impotence with American allies led the US 
Senate to propose an ultimatum with a deadline. ‘If the 
Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group’s 
proposal of July 6, 94...by October 15, 94 the president 
should formally introduce and support a resolution in the 
UN Security Council to terminate the international arms 
embargo.’ If that proposal is vetoed, says the Senate, the 
president should summit a plan to lift the embargo 
unilaterally....This ultimatum was proposed because the 
world has learned that the way to make peace with the 
Bosnian Serbs is to put guns to their heads”.
However, hopes for unilateral US action were to be dashed again in early 
October, when the last shreds of a separate US policy vanished: the 
Administration walked away from President Clinton’s earlier written pledge to 
the Congress to seek a UNSC vote to lift the arms embargo by October 15. 
d’he excuse was that Bosnia’s government was now willing to delay lifting the
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embargo until spring 1995, provided that the UNSC took binding action on it 
immediately. Despite all, under continuing pressure from the Congress from 
November and especially December onwards the US began to make the world 
feel its weight more heavily on the Bosnian issue. The NATO-UN 
relationship on the ground was deteriorating fast and the credibility of NATO
90began to be questioned more widely than ever before.
In November 1994 “under a congressional mandate, US ships which had been 
working alongside US-NATO allies and Western European Union 
contingents, were in effect told they should no longer interdict vessels 
carrying arms to the Bosnian Muslims nor would they be allowed to exchange 
intelligence information about such activities with US allies” . This was an 
important step showing that the US was underlying its stance on the issue.
‘‘ Shortly after this, a similar decision was taken by the 
Turkish government. However, this change in the position 
of two NATO members did not affect the other allies. Upon 
the US decision NATO Secretary General Willy Claes made 
clear that the alliance would continue to carry out ‘operation 
sharp guard and fully implement enforcement of all 
embargoes’.”3'
All this deteriorating relationship between the UN and NATO and NATO’s 
inaction was severely criticized by the Republican leader in the Congress, Mr.
80
Dole from late November onwards. He expressed frustration with the UN’s 
role and stated that “the UN should get off NATO’s back and let NATO take 
care of Serbian aggression and tell them I do not see any reason for their 
existence if they have to take orders from the UN.”^^
In fact the UN position had become weird in Bosnia because the real aim of 
the UN peacekeepers was to protect the safe areas and the Bosnians from Serb 
attacks. But at the end of November 1994, up to 400 peacekeepers were being 
detained by the Bosnian Serbs. Faced with renewed criticisms, President 
Clinton was now prepared to commit up to 4000 American troops to help in 
evacuation of British and other UN forces from Bosnia should they be
evacuated. 33
Even at this stage, the US did not appear prepared to break with its European 
Allies. Therefore, in mid-December the US and France drew closer to find a 
solution. According to diplomats at NATO headquarters, each country had a 
hidden as well as an overt agenda. France was promoting a plan to regroup 
and reinforce the UN mission in Bosnia, which would have the happy side 
effect of making it much easier to withdraw should that become unavoidable. 
The US threw its weight behind the idea of a massive NA'1'0 operation to
provide “cover for an eventual UN pull-out from Bosnia. If it ever goes 
ahead, this operation would also have a side-effect; it would satisfy the long 
standing US demand for effective western intervention against the Serbs. "^* 
But it was obvious that all these talks were getting nowhere.
While those plans or tactics were being discussed, the former US president 
Jimmy Carter went to Bosnia with a sudden Balkan peace mission and in 
December 24th Bosnian Serbs and Muslims singed a country-wide interim 
cease-fire agreement.^^ This truce, in fact, gave the US time to make a quick 
réévaluation of its policy, the positive and negative impacts of the decisions, 
and maybe the parameters of a new and more independent foreign policy were 
determined during this break. Such a réévaluation was certainly necessary as 
the year 1994 clearly pointed to a confusion in US policy-making.
“Press reports during this period provide a kaleidoscope of 
shifting positions with senior US leaders cited as having no 
appetite for increasing military action one day and then 
wanting more military action days later. This uncertainty 
reflected the administration’s inability to develop a policy 
that would attain the results it wanted - a peaceful, 
harmonious, multiethnic and preferably unified Bosnia - 
while avoiding the introduction of US forces that would be 
required to impose such a policy assuming that it could be
imposed”.36
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CHAPTER V
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1995 AND THE US POLICY:
5.1. The Situation on the Ground at the Beginning of 1995
The year 1995 started with a four-month truce which had been worked out by 
ex-president Jimmy Carter. He worked out the broad lines o f the cease-fire, 
but then it fell to the UN commander in Bosnia, to nail down the details. The 
Muslim-led government and the Bosnian Serbs had signed the truce but the 
Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia, fighting in the northwest Bihac 
enclave, had not.
With a four-month cease-fire in place in Bosnia and broadly holding for now, 
it was thought that political negotiations could be pursued by the Contact 
Group. During this truce, officials from the five nations seeking peace in 
Bosnia, reached an outline agreement in February 1995 on a plan that would 
offer a further easing of sanctions on Serbia in exchange for its recognition of 
Bosnia and Croatia. The US agreed with these new proposals but it appeared 
that some differences persisted between France and the US over what degree 
of sanctions relief President Milosevic should be offered. The French favored
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a complete suspension while the Clinton administration wanted to be more 
cautious by offering progressive relief Under both countries’ plans, sanctions 
were to be quickly reimposed if Milosevic were seen to be giving military aid 
to the Bosnian or Croatian Serbs. But it was not easy to lure the Serbs. For 
instance, President Milosevic found it difficult to recognise Bosnia and 
Croatia. At the time, about 70 per cent of Bosnia and close to a third of 
Croatia were held by Serbs whom he himself had created and supported. 
Thus, recognition of Bosnia and Croatia within their international borders 
would, in the eyes of many Serbs, amount to President Milosevic’s formal 
betrayal of the Serbs’ dream of uniting in a single state.'
The consent of the US to this proposal was shocking in many respects as 
Marshall Freeman Flarris, a former US Bosnia desk officer in the State 
Department who had resigned in protest at US inaction explains in his article 
entitled ‘Clinton’s Debacle in Bosnia’“,
“ twenty months earlier the administration had decided to 
launch, albeit ineptly, a policy to halt Serbian aggression 
with airstrikes and a full weapons program for Milosevic’s 
victims. Now it was prepared to take no action at all against 
Serbia if Milosevic would merely grant diplomatic 
recognition to his besieged neighbors. This capitulation 
brought Russia out of the cold and into open support of 
Serbia’s demand for an unconditional suspensions of 
sanctions”.
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Indeed the US policy was still drifting. The only good thing was that the 
Administration was still revising its policy, and this revision coupled with 
continuous pressure from the Congress led the US to a point where there was 
much less hesitancy about the use of force than ever before.
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground was moving. On March 6, Croatia 
formed a military alliance with the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia that added 
muscle to the anti-Serb front in both republics. The Croat-Bosnia Accord 
theoretically would permit Croatia to get officially involved in fighting in 
Bosnia, in those areas such as the north-western Bihac pocket on the Croatian 
border. With support from the Croatian Government, the Federation was now 
in a stronger position in the battlefield and eventually at the negotiating table 
against the Serbs. The US appeared to be pleased with this development 
while the UN expressed uneasiness. From May onwards, the Bosnian War 
started to be fastened and so did the US calculations on the future of it. First 
of all Croatia reoccupied Western Slavonia. This was a good sign of the 
Croatian military improvement against the Serbs. T'here were press reports 
citing that the US had given Croatia a green light to serve as a port of entry for 
the Iranian shipments of arms that would then be delivered to the Bosnian
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army.^ Meanwhile, the Serbian mortar attacks on Sarajevo were continuing 
and the fears for the future of safe areas were growing. These attacks 
continued to create an outcry."^
In particular, when the Bosnian Serbs took 350 UN peacekeepers hostage after 
a NATO bombing of an ammunition depot near their headquarters of Pale, this 
public anger began to be more noticeable, and President Clinton prodded the 
UN to order NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions. The goal of the 
new policy, as outlined by US officials, was “ to use consistent force to oblige 
the Bosnian Serbs to respect UN resolutions and peacekeepers in Bosnia, thus 
reviving prospects for peace and preserving the embattled UN mission.”
The scenes of UN soldiers taken as hostages by the Serbs were really 
humiliatory. Western countries were pressing Milosevic to help release them. 
Britain and France decided to send in a rapid-reaction force to strengthen UN 
troops. But it soon turned out that the driving force behind this idea of 
sending in a rapid reaction force was these European countries’ doubts over 
the NATO plan. Because the US believed it should be under full NATO (i.e. 
US) control during any temporary action, and that US commanders should in 
eftbct control all operations in Bosnia during this time, France repeated the
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same old objections saying that this would jeopardize peace-keepers 
elsewhere in Bosnia, and that it would make it difficult to return to normal UN 
operations. Once more the European argument prevailed and the new rapid 
reaction force effectively sidelined the NATO version. Nevertheless, NATO 
continued to plan for its own force, and that it began to express doubts over 
the Anglo-French force’s ability to fulfill the same functions. It was clear that 
under pressure from the Congress as well as the engaged US public. 
President’s ability to resist involvement in Bosnia on a larger scale than it had 
been the case was being curtailed. He stated, for instance, in a speech at the 
US air force academy that “after consulting with the Congress, 1 believe we 
should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the UN 
troops for help in a withdrawal, or a reconfiguration and strengthening of its 
forces”.'’ The announcement was welcomed by the Europeans who took it at 
its face value. But it was swiftly decried by Republicans and Democrats at 
home. Robert Dole, the senate majority leader, challenged Clinton’s policy by 
announcing that he would introduce legislation within a few days barring any 
use of American ground troops except to assist a total withdrawal o f the UN
7peacekeeping force.
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In the second half of June, thousands of Bosnian Croat troops and regular 
Croatian troops, allied to the Bosnian government declared themselves ready 
to coordinate their efforts against the Serb separatists. The Bosnian 
government army launched one of the biggest offensive against the Serbs by 
breaking through their supply lines and opening up fronts all around the 
besieged capital of Sarajevo. Meanwhile, some US analysts and politicians 
were calling for a covert build-up of the Bosnian government army in 
accordance with the ‘Reagan Doctrine’.
“In the 1980s President Reagan’s administration 
successfully countered the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
and destabilized a pro-Soviet regime in Nicaragua by 
supplying local resistance fighters with sophisticated 
weapons. Arguing that US should apply the same principles 
to the Bosnian conflict, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed arming, 
training and resupplying the government army, giving it 
financial assistance, and sharing intelligence with it. The 
policy would not involve any US or foreign troops, but 
would actively engage America in support of the Bosnian 
Government” ^
Though Britain and France, which had the largest contingents, threatened to 
pull their troops out of Bosnia if the embargo was to be lifted, advocates of 
covertly arming the Bosnians contended that the ‘gradual erosion’ of the arms 
embargo would not cause a UN withdrawal. Even if it did, the new weapons 
would help the Bosnians defeat an expected Serbian onslaught and enable
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them to start winning back some of the seventy percent of Bosnia occupied by 
the Serbs.
These discussions taking place in the US led to a new row between the US and 
the Europeans. For instance, few days after this new NATO intelligence 
reports indicated that the Bosnian Serbs had been equipped by the Belgrade 
government with advanced ground-to-air missiles which had been locked into 
a sophisticated radar system used by the former Yugoslav Federal Army, 
France continued to accuse the US of arming the Muslims, arguing that the 
US backed military action by the Muslim Bosnians whereas the Europeans 
were neutral.
The French accusation underlined once again the continuing divisions over 
Bosnia between the US and its European Allies. The US believed that the 
Europeans’ neutrality in the war had had the effect o f consolidating Bosnian 
Serb gains, while the Europeans faulted the US for advocating support for the 
Muslims without regard to the possibility that this could spark a wider Balkan 
War.^ The irony was that although the US had never ruled out using military 
force all along, the European Powers, Britain and France, managed to keep the 
US from moving along the line of military action. This was still the case on
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the eve of one of the severest Serb onslaughts on the ‘safe areas’ in Eastern 
Bosnia.
5.2. The Fall of the Safe Areas and the US
In July, the Serbs captured the two ‘safe areas’ in the east, Srebrenica and 
Zcpa, leaving a third, Gorazde exposed to a Serb onslaught. This increased 
the uneasiness and humiliation of the Western powers. The UN’s moral 
credibility was all but destroyed. It led to a NATO warning that any attacks 
on safe areas would incur massive air strikes while the then reported mass 
killings at Srebrenica raised the possibility of a disastrous, US assisted 
evacuation of UN forces. But clearly the Europeans’ wavering was still going 
on. It was presumably at this stage that the Administration began to reassess 
its role.
Meanwhile, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic had been indicted by the UN 
War Crimes Tribunal. All this moved the US to conclude that it had to do 
something with or without the Allies. For one thing, any further inaction 
under the pretext that the Administration wished to aet together with European 
allies was likely to stir enormous difficulties with the Congress. For another, 
with the eleetion year looming ahead, the Administration could no longer
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explain to the enraged American public its inaction in the face of an ongoing 
genocide which daily filled television screens. While the US reassessment 
was going on, the Croats took the offensive in the occupied Krajina, 
recovering the gateway to the Dalmatian coast, with its lucrative tourist 
industry, without having to give political autonomy to the region’s Serbian 
population.
The reaction of President Clinton and other US officials to the Croatian 
onslaught was to ask the Croats ‘to exercise real restraint’ and to suggest that 
it was ‘animated by the Serbian attack on Bihac’. While reluctant to condemn 
the Croatian action, behind - the - scenes, the US involvement in the Croat 
offensive created a moral imperative for the US to work for an equitable 
settlement for all the parties to the conflict in Bosnia as well." Croat victory 
in the Krajina not only exposed Serbs to further attacks in Bosnia but it also 
ended all those legends about the Serbs’ invincibility. Now, for instance a 
joint Croat-Muslim offensive was underway against Bosnian Serb strongholds 
in Western Bosnia.
The US now felt the need to consider the use of force in order to further peace 
efforts. Indeed, the National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake’s earlier efforts
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had prepared the ground. The President now appointed Assistant Secretary of
State, Richard Holbrooke, as his special envoy with the task of coordinating
peace efforts and negotiating all details leading to a comprehensive settlement.
No sooner had Richard Holbrooke embarked on his mission then the Serbs
blundered again in Bosnia. They slammed another mortar shell into the
market place in Sarajevo on August 28th, 1995, killing at least 37 people and
wounding more than eighty others. This was the last straw: the US could no
longer defer to London or Paris. Now, unilateralism prevailed. As Mr.
Holbrooke put it “the attack angered President Clinton, and he told the UN
and our NATO allies that we would wait no longer; it was time to ‘hit the
Bosnian Serbs hard’. His determination led to the start of the massive NATO 
12air campaign.”
“It was at this point, on 29 August (before NATO’s 
Operation Deliberate Force bombing campaign even began), 
that Bosnian Serb president Karadzic obtained the 
agreement of the Bosnian Serb Assembly to form a joint 
negotiating team with Serbia, a procedure which was to 
facilitate the negotiations leading to Dayton Accords. 
Indeed, while the fighting continued for weeks, this 
procedure allowed Serbia’s President Milosevic to negotiate 
on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, marked the Bosnian Serbs’ 
acknowledgment that they were in danger of losing even 
more territory, and set the state for a negotiated 
outcome”. ' 3
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5.3. The US Intervention and the Beginning of Peace Process
In response to the 28 August Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo, and in 
recognition that NATO’s credibility would disappear if it did not carry out its 
threats to respond to further Serb attacks, on 30 August the US and its NATO 
allies launched a concerted air campaign against Serb forces. The bombing 
further weakened the Serbs’ ability to repulse the Croat-Muslim groups and 
created an important factor in persuading the Serbs to accept and reach 
agreement at the peace talks.
While on the one hand the NATO operation was carried out, the US was 
trying to persuade the parties to ‘its’ peace plan with the efforts of Clinton’s 
special envoy Holbrooke through shuttle diplomacy, on the other. There is no 
doubt that NATO bombing of Serbs was helping to narrow those differences. 
Though Russia, Serbia’s main ally, started complaining loudly about the 
duration of the NATO bombing and even some NATO countries grew uneasy 
about it, this time the US was in no mood to yield immediately.
The Serbs’ resistance was broken soon and they expressed their readiness to 
accept the US’ proposed peace plan. I'his facilitated the peace process, and in
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September, two agreements at meetings of foreign ministers of the three 
countries, Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia - the first in Geneva on September 8th 
and the second in New York on September 26th - were announced. Those 
agreements were hailed as ‘ an important milestone’ by Richard Holbrooke 
and ‘ a good first step’ by President Clinton towards an overall peace 
agreement in the Balkans. Those accords established a single Bosnian state 
consisting of two entities, one Serb with the name ‘República Srpska’, and the 
other, Moslem-Croat with the title Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Territorial proposal was left for adjustment by mutual agreement. Both 
entities were to have the right to establish parallel special relationships with 
neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Bosnia. The provision would only allow the Serbs to have special links to 
Serbia, but it would let the Bosnian government maintain and develop its ties 
to Croatia without jeopardizing [Bosnia’s border.'"*
Although there were some unresolved points - for example, there was no 
agreement on formal recognition of Bosnia by rump Yugoslavia - the accord 
was no doubt a very important achievement by the US. Within 30 days, 
Richard Holbrooke and his team visited 11 countries which shifted the 
momentum towards peace. Before October, Richard Holbrooke obtained the
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lifting of the siege of Sarajevo in return for a recommendation to NATO to 
suspend the bombing.
Until November, there were still ups and downs in the peace process. But 
with intense US diplomatic efforts, the US managed to start peace talks in 
Dayton, Ohio. And, on November 21st, a peace deal was initialed by the 
Presidents o f Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The Accord’s main points are as 
following; NATO troops were to supervise separation of forces; Bosnia 
would be an internationally recognized state within its present borders; that 
state was to be composed of a Bosnia Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croat 
Federation; the capital, Sarajevo would remain united under the Muslim-Croat 
Federation; the central government was to include a parliament, presidency 
and constitutional court; free democratic elections would take place under 
international supervision; refugees were to be allowed to return to their homes 
or seek equitable compensation; human rights would be monitored by an 
independent commission; people indicted for war crimes were to be excluded 
from political life.''^
The US success in brokering the Bosnia peace accord caused remorse and 
embarrassment in the EU, shattering its superpower illusions and underscoring
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its failure to achieve a cohesive security policy that could resolve conflicts in 
its own backyard.'** European states in the Contact Group complained of 
being kept barely abreast of what was going on, while Balkan leaders said 
they were bullied. Apparently, everybody at some stage got shouted at. 
Warren Christopher conceded that pressure tactics were at times used to keep 
the participants talking. “I must say that from time to time we urged them to
do that in fairly strong terms.' ,17
Though the peace was achieved there was still a problem that President 
Clinton should cope with. He had to convince the Congress to approve the 
deployment of 20 000 US troops to Bosnia, a third of the NATO force that 
was to go in to keep the peace. In order to persuade the Congress, he said that 
without American troops in the NATO force ‘ the slaughter of innocents will 
begin again. In the choice between peace and war, America must choose 
peace.’ This speech was viewed as perhaps President Clinton’s most 
important speech on a foreign policy issue, one in which he heavily invested 
both America’s credibility and his own political future. He tried to reassure 
the Congress by saying that 20 000 US troops to be sent would have the 
firepower and the authority both to enforce the peace and to protect 
themselves while carrying out a mission of clear scope and limited duration.
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While many Republicans opposed the sending of US troops to Bosnia, the 
immediate response to the President’s speech was reserved.'* On 13 
December - a day before signing of the accord reached in Dayton - the Senate 
voted for the deployment of American troops, 69 to 30, on the condition that 
the US leads an international effort to arm and train the Bosnian government 
army.
The NATO force would remain in Bosnia for at least one year to help 
implement the Agreement at the end of 1996; the duration of that force would 
be extended with a new multinational peacekeeping force aimed at bringing 
stability to the Balkans. That meant the continuation of the presence of the 
US troops in the Balkans which faced a republican opposition in the Congress. 
The Europeans’ failure in Bosnia made this quite clear that NAT O works as a 
“substitute for European unity because at key junctures the US compels the 
Europeans to make tough decisions. Without US leadership in NATO, 
therefore, negative economic consequences will eventually touch Americans’ 
pocketbooks”.'*'
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
When the Yugoslav dissolution erupted into violence in the summer of 1991, 
major European powers were taken aback. The US administration did not fare 
any better despite the CIA’s earlier warnings that the war in Yugoslavia was 
forthcoming. At the time, Bush Administration’s attention was still firmly 
focused on the Gulf War and its aftermath: the Kurdish exodus into Turkey and 
Iran, plans to set afoot ‘provide comfort’ to protect them inside Northern Iraq and 
all the related problems. The Administration in general, and the military in 
particular, still looked mesmerized with the victory in the Gulf when JNA tanks 
rolled into Slovenia.
The war in the Balkans was certainly a challenge for the US to meet in the post 
cold-war era. However, as outlined throughout, the US did not appear ready to 
provide the required leadership, and its policies fluctuated at best, or most oi the 
time, the US did not seem to have a policy at all while the genocidal war was 
going on. Much of that may well be ascribed to a number of misconceptions and 
misjudgments within the US policy-making circles about the causes of the conflict 
in Yugoslavia. The US administrations, both Bush’ and Clinton’, did not seem 
clear about the US’ role in the 1990s in world affairs and the use of force as an 
instrument of foreign policy.
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For instance, the belief among key US officials when Yugoslav unity was 
challenged in 1991 that Yugoslavia would somehow muddle through molded the 
initial approach by the US to the war in Slovenia and Croatia. The irony was that 
though Bush Administration became a staunch supporter of preserving 
Yugoslavia, on the grounds that any encouragement to secessionist forces would 
lead to war, and that a Yugoslav break-up might rekindle aspirations by all ethnic 
groups to independence, unleashing a series of armed clashes and perhaps leading 
to the violent dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was its policy of preservation that 
accelerated the slide into armed conflict in Yugoslavia. The US apparently feared 
that, should Socialist Republics of Yugoslav Federation disintegrate and the 
break-away republics be recognized, this would set an awful precedent for the 
Soviet Union, which the West, above all the US, had vowed to keep together at all 
cost with Gorbachev at its head. Oddly, the Soviet Union went through a rather 
fast, bloodless and unexpected break-up while the Serbs with the JNA at their 
disposal were carrying on with ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign on a scale unseen on 
European soil since the Second World War. But the US policy of preserving 
Yugoslavia remained largely unaffected by what happened in the Soviet Union.
While non-interventionists led by Colin Powell determined the debate inside the 
US policy-making circles and articulated all the reasons why the US should not 
get militarily involved in the Balkans, the European factor provided an undecided 
administration with an excuse for remaining aloof fhe conflict was, after all.
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taking place in Europe’s backyard, and the Europeans should do more to contain 
it.
The war in Bosnia began in the midst of the US Presidential election campaign in 
1992, and the incumbent president was under considerable attaek from his 
Democrat rival to the effect that George Bush had aeted like a US Secretary of 
State rather than a president, and that he had neglected American economy and 
domestic problems. These attacks forced President Bush to duck behind the 
European excuse so much that he remained unmoved when the news of Serbs’ 
death camps broke in the summer of 1992, and even when his presidential rival 
began critieizing his inaction over Bosnia. He and his team appeared well- 
entrenched in the Vietnam syndrome.
Clinton Administration took office with a vow to help Bosnians militarily. 
However, his domestic agenda, economy and health care, with which he was 
elected, was to consume much of his time. Indeed after some initial rhetorie, his 
team began to regard Bosnia as a distraction from home affairs. True, the Clinton 
team formulated the right policy, ‘lift and strike’ in April-May 1993, the ‘strike’ 
part of which certainly worked in late summer of 1995, but the Administration 
gave in easily to European pressure. And some sort of multilateralism whose 
content fluctuated from the UN to the European allies began to determine policy 
discussions within the Administration. In addition, the military, the Pentagon,
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remained skeptical at best about, or absolutely opposed to, the wisdom of any 
military action in Bosnia lor so long after the resignation of Colin Powell. In 
other words, though he left, his departure did not change the mindset of the top 
US military leadership. His military doctrine, which refused any military 
involvement in Bosnia, stayed alive and well within the confines of the Pentagon.
Under these circumstances, the US Administration tried to downplay the 
importance of Bosnia, and its policy fluctuated. Basically, the whole business 
was left to the Europeans to handle though, one must acknowledge, the Americans 
never ruled out the option of using force in the form of air strikes and the lifting of 
the arms embargo unilaterally on the Bosnian government. However, all this was 
to be done multilaterally, namely in consultation and agreement with the 
Europeans which did their best every now and then to indicate that the use of 
force to achieve a peace was out of the question.
This new equation basically tied US’ hands for quite some time, particularly, in 
1993 and 1994 though the US pressure brought about the Moslem-Croat 
Federation in 1994, which gradually became a corner-stone in the ensuing peace 
negotiations. All of this inhibition came to an end in 1995, when the US 
Administration realized that it could not really put up a fight with the Congress 
which had long been asking for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
government to be combined with air strikes against Serb positions. It was clear
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that the Congress’s patience was wearing thin in the face of growing Serb 
defiance and the ongoing genocide about which there came out compelling 
evidence in Western press. That Serb atrocities filled daily television screens and 
enraged the American public was the last straw which galvanized the 
Administration into action with or without European allies. With the Presidential 
elections looming the US Administration could no longer take ‘sophisticated’ 
European counsel.
The peace deal Richard Holbrooke struck was not an indigenous American plan, 
though. It was mostly based on previous attempts, all o f which had smacked of 
appeasement. It gave rise to criticism that the US acted to enforce a European 
peace plan, and that its implementation would lead to the partition of Bosnia. 
This was not without foundation. Indeed, initial implementation appeared to 
cement the division between the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Moslem-Croat 
Federation. No attempt has been made to arrest the indicted war criminals, and 
the general elections held in mid-September 1996 strengthened nationalists 
forces’ grip over the country. It seemed that Dayton Accords rewarded ethnic 
cleansing and, therefore, set a bad precedent in the region. Nevertheless, the only 
good thing is that following a year-long deployment of NATO implementation 
force, IFOR, to keep peace across the country, a new force was configurated, 
SFOR, stabilization force, with the task of building peace in Bosnia for a period 
o f 16 months. 1’his demonstrated US’ continuing interest in stability in Bosnia,
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surely the most important factor to keep the peace and prevent the partitioning of 
the country.
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